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The desirability of the free trade in goods and 
services is one of the few unchallenged laws of economics.1 *
The opportunity to trade without the distortions of various 
types of barriers, whether discriminatory subsidies, direct 
or indirect tariffs, or total denial of certain goods from a 
market, is a panacea which, to the disappointment of 
economists, will escape the current world trading system.
But the unreachable goal to which the economists would 
strive is an uninhibited market place. Unfortunately, much 
of the history of world trade has been one of protectionism 
for domestic industries to the detriment of the desire to 
reap the benefits of an open world market.
The early economic history of the United States 
followed this protectionist path, and was impacted by the 
protectionist policies of trading partners. Before the 
Declaration of Independence in 1776, the colonies were given 
favored trading status with the government of Great
. . 9 , , ,Britain. Great Britain granted this status to all of the
1Paul Krugman, "Rethinking International Trade,"
Business Economics. 12 (April 1988) .
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nations within her commonwealth; the economic development of 
the commonwealth was of the utmost importance to the Crown. 
But when the colonies declared their independence from 
Britain, the favored trading status previously received by 
the colonies was revoked. Revoking this special trading 
status caused great hardships within a young United States.
A mechanism to allow for a more civilized trading system was 
needed even in the 1770s. The world strived for what
Freiden and Lake.called a hegemonic leader; a country
(willing to take the lead for the liberalization of world 
trade.* 4
In the more recent history of the global trading 
relationship, i.e. since the mid 1800's, Britain, with its 
large commonwealth, assumed the role as the true hegemonic 
leader in the third quarter of the nineteenth century; its 
leadership would last until the 1880's.^ No other country 
in the world could affect the global trading system as 
Britain did in the mid to late 1800's. Britain was willing 
to sacrifice some of its own wealth in order that it may 
free up the trading relationship that existed in that time;
^Jaboc Reimer. The Economic History of the U.sT 
Constitution. (New York: St. Martins, 1989).
Although the Crown protected the colonies from tariffs 
its intentions weren't solely for philanthropic reasons; the Crown stood to gain from the generation of tax incomes from 
all colonies as they prospered.
4David A. Lake and Jeffry A. Frieden, International 
Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth. 
(New York: St. Martins, 1987).
5Ibid.
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the result would be a short-term loss of wealth for a long- 
term gain m  wealth. While Britain played the role of 
hegemonic leader, the United States could pursue 
protectionist policies for its own trade and pursue 
expansionist export policies abroad.* 7 During the late 
1800's Britain came to see that it could no longer afford to 
utilize its own resources to accomplish this goal.
Britain's economy was based on primary industry and its rich
natural resource base. At first the industrial revolution
(
was a blessing for Great Britain, but eventually put Britain 
at a disadvantage because of its failure to reevaluate its 
economic policies after the industrial revolution. Britain 
lagged behind other countries in post industrial revolution 
modernization. The torch of hegemonic leadership had to be 
passed to another country willing to commit resources 
necessary to free world trade. That country was the United 
States.
The torch of hegemonic leader was not passed outright, 
as the United States didn't go out and immediately 
liberalize world trade. The United States took several
It appeared that Great Britain was willing to allow
free trade in manufactured goods in an effort to slowindustrial development in other European countries. Britain 
felt that it could gain in the long run by freeing trade 
because its manufacturing sector was much more productive 
and advanced than other European countries. For further 
discussion of Britain and free trade see David Lake and 
Jeffry A. Freiden, International Political Economy: 
Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth. (New York: St. Martins, 1987).
7Ibid.
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• • ftyears to complete its metamorphis from follower to leader.
The United States didn't assume the role of a true hegemonic
leader until after World War II. In leading world trade
liberalization, the United States was willing to permit an
open market for the goods of many countries, and in many
cases, the closing of those countries markets for American
goods, in exchange for the economic and political stability
of those countries.8 9 The rise of the United States as a
hegemonic leader could also be seen in the abundance of free
itrade negotiations with Canada, as will be discussed further 
in the next section of this chapter. Unfortunately, the 
United States found that it could not act alone to 
successfully liberalize world trade because other countries 
were willing to reap the benefits of greater trade 
opportunities in the United States, but were unwilling to 
open their markets for fear of damage to current production 
patterns.10
A new impetus for a more liberalized world trading 
system didn't occur until after World War II. One of the 
major goals of the system was not only to remove much of the 
barriers to world trade that had plagued its history, but 
implicitly appeared to be an attempt to strengthen world
8Ibid.
9 • •^Ibid. The classic example of this phenomenom is the 
acceptance of Japanese imports in the U.S. marketplace 
without a reciprocal arrangement in the Japanese market for American goods.
iUDavid Lake and Jeffry A. Fneden, International
Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Wealth and Power.
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democracy. In 1947 the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) was signed by twenty-three countries to work 
toward these goals. The member nations of GATT have 
recognized the need to ensure that the world market system 
will benefit all of its members. The GATT has succeeded in 
achieving a less restrictive world trading system, but after 
the first ten years of the GATT, it was evident that the 
fight to liberalize world trade would be very difficult.
The trading relationship among the members of GATT was
(
becoming more confrontational. The idea of free trade among 
most western nations was no longer viewed as a reachable 
goal; free trade became recognized as a goal not for the 
world, but among regions.
In 1958 many of the western European nations 
entertained the idea of creating a regional free trade area 
for the production of steel; the motive for such an 
agreement was the more efficient production of steel and 
with it lower prices to domestic consumers. It is from this 
1958 pact that the European Economic Community (EEC)11 was 
born. The EEC has continued in its development since the 
steel production pact and will achieve its goal of full 
economic integration of member nations by the 1992.
The relative success of the EEC has created interest by 
other nations in creating similar arrangements with trading 
neighbors. Besides the 1960 European Free Trade Area, four
11 •The EEC is sometimes referred to as the European Common Market.
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agreements are particularly relevant: the 1965 United 
Kingdom-Ireland Free Trade Agreement; the 1983 Australia-New 
Zealand Closer Economic Relations Agreement; and the 1985 
United States-Israel Agreement. Although all of these 
agreements pursue closer economic ties for parties to each 
agreement, none has ramifications for creating a broader 
free trade arrangement than the United States-Canada Free 
Trade Agreement. Although closer economic ties between the 
United States and Canada was one reason for pursuing a free 
trade agreement, the United States implicitly had a second 
very important reason, stopping an export subsidy war with 
the EEC.
It appears that the United States hopes creating its 
own free trade area will force the EEC to go back to the 
bargaining table in the current round of the GATT talks to 
settle the current agricultural subsidy dispute between the 
EEC and the United States.12 With the agreement over a 
United States-Canada free trade area, the American's believe 
that they will hold the trump card in this subsidy dispute. 
Thus far, the EEC has offered little reaction to the 
American-Canadian pact.
IP • ,In order to compete with the more efficient
production of the United States, the EEC has provided its
producers with heavy production subsidies so that EEC
producers can compete for lucrative world grain markets.
Without the subsidies, the EEC producers would effectively
be priced out of the market, and the consequence in the EEC
would be significant loss of agricultural jobs.
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On January 1, 1989 the United States-Canada Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) began its implementation process.13 This 
agreement has been described as the most comprehensive trade 
agreement ever undertaken because it provides liberalization 
in all sectors of trade.14 But with a wide-sweeping 
agreement with the potential to affect the economic well­
being of both nations comes the anxiety of change. Although 
the desirability of free trade has been argued by many
economists from its father, Adam Smith, to the present
(
advocates of this agreement, convincing the public of its 
desirability has been the most difficult task of gaining 
acceptance of the FTA.
Within the United States there was little debate on the 
desirability of the FTA; there was very little mention of 
the FTA in the media. Allowing a relatively small world 
trader virtually unimpeded access to the American market 
didn't scare the U.S. Congress. But some of the most vocal 
American opponents of the FTA came from North Dakota: the 
Governor of North Dakota, George Sinner; and North Dakota's 
leaders in Washington, Senators Quentin Burdick and Kent 
Conrad, and Representative Byron Dorgan. Each of these 
leaders has expressed reservations over the agreement 
because of the fear that North Dakota's two economic
13The FTA calls for a tariff reduction schedule 
depending on the readiness of the industry to compete. A further discussion of the tariff reduction schedule occurs in chapter three.
14External Affairs Canada, Canada-U.S. Free Trade 
Agreement [Ottawa, Ont.]: External Affairs Canada, 1988.
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mainstays, agriculture and energy, will experience decline 
due to the provisions of this agreement. In contrast to the 
lack of debate in the United States, Canada has experienced 
a more thorough debate on the desirability of free trade.
In Canada, the debate over the desirability of free 
trade with the Americans produced deep cleavages. The 
debate was passionate over closer economic ties with the 
United States and its potential effect over Canadian 
sovereignty. An~ election was eventually called in Canada 
during the FTA's ratification period in which the central 
issue became the desirability of free trade with the United 
States. The outcome of the election paved the way for 
implementation of the FTA. The effects of the agreement 
can't be fully known at this time; nevertheless, the purpose 
of this independent study is to examine the FTA's potential 
impacts on the energy sector of the North Dakota economy.
The remainder of this chapter will examine the impacts 
that the energy sector has had on the development of North 
Dakota's economy and the impacts a movement of decline or 
growth in energy production under the FTA would have on the 
state's economy. Chapter two examines past attempts at free 
trade between the United States and Canada, and provides a 
synopsis of the provisions of the FTA; a breakdown of trade 
between North Dakota and Canada is included. Chapter three 
examines the pure theory of free trade, its desirability, 
and presents a literature review of the expected impacts of 
the FTA for each country as a whole. Chapter four provides
9
an analysis of the specific impacts that the FTA will have 
on North Dakota's energy sector. Chapter five provides a 
conclusion and recommendations for the State of North Dakota 
regarding the FTA, based solely on its energy provisions.
North Dakota's Economy
Stradley examined the economic history of North Dakota 
using the staple hypothesis of Melville Watkins and found 
that North Dakota's economic development has been largely 
the result of its two staple sectors: agriculture and
*1 C  , , , ,energy. The basic assumption of the staple hypothesis is 
that a staple export is the leading sector of an economy; 
the pace of economic development is regulated by the 
staple.* 16 178
Stradley argues that economic development in North 
Dakota was the result of its agriculture and energy 
resources. The development of staple industries in turn 
fueled the development of other sectors of the economy, or
• • • , 1 Oin the case of decline in a staple, cause economic havoc. 
Stradley called this process of incidental economic
*1 R  ,Scot A. Stradley, A Staple Perspective on Economic 
Development in North Dakota. (University of North Dakota: 
Bureau of Business and Economic Research, May 1981). See 
also Melville H. Watkins, "A Staple Theory of Economic Growth," The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political 
Science. 29 (May 1963).
16Harold A. Innis, The Fur Trade in Canada quoted in 
Scot A. Stradley's A Staple Perspective on Economic Development in North Dakota.
17Stradley, A Staple Perspective
18Ibid.
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development "spread effects."19 Watkin's staple hypothesis 
described economic development occurring from a staple 
industry by means of linkages; forward linkages, backward 
linkages, and final demand linkages.20
Forward linkages are industries that utilize the output 
of the staple industry. An example of a forward linkage 
would be a manufacturing plant that chooses to settle in the 
state because of an abundance of energy. Backward linkages 
are industries that facilitate production of the staple 
export. An example of a backward linkage would be a 
construction company that must build a facility to generate 
electricity in the case of thermal-electric generation. A 
final demand linkage would consist of economic activities 
designed to provide goods for people working in, and related 
to, the staple industry, such as government or a grocery 
store.21 Stradley demonstrated that the agricultural staple 
played a great part in developing North Dakota's early 
economy. The development of the staple energy sector 
occurred much later in the state's history than its 
agricultural sector, but as a staple energy certainly wasn't 
insignificant in the state's most recent history.
19Ibid.
20 Melville H. Watkins "A Staple Theory of Economic 
Growth," in Stradley's "A Staple Perspective of Economic Development in North Dakota.
21Melville H. Watkins "A Staple Theory of Economic 
Growth," in Stradley's "A Staple Perspective of Economic Development in North Dakota.
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North Dakota's two chief economic bases would have the 
potential to make the state a relatively powerful nation in 
itself, given that the demand and price for commodities 
associated with these two sectors remained strong at all 
times. But such an economy, relying on raw materials and 
natural resources without a developed manufacturing sector, 
has the distinction of being guided by boom and bust cycles. 
Such an economy, with manufacturing virtually non-existant, 
is dependent on the success of other sectors of the economy, 
both domestically and, in the case of North Dakota, 
internationally.
In its one hundred year history, North Dakota's economy 
has been at the mercy of production factors outside of the 
control of the United States, let alone its own producers. 
Some of these factors had positive effects on North Dakota's 
economy; some had negative effects. Agricultural subsidies 
worldwide have directly affected this state's producers. 
Farmers in the state have suffered as result of the low 
prices paid for the commodities its farmers produce, causing 
many farmers to give up on farming, whether voluntarily 
(seeking other employment) or involuntarily (credit 
foreclosures).
North Dakota's petroleum producers have been at the 
mercy of the controlling cartel of the production of crude 
oil, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC). The State's producers are powerless to affect the 
price paid per barrel of its own crude. In 1973, OPEC's oil
12
embargo on the United States produced a positive effect on 
North Dakota's petroleum industry as prices soared and 
production rose sharply to meet domestic demand. The result 
was an increase in employment in both the petroleum industry 
itself as well as other sectors as a result of spread 
effects. Unfortunately for North Dakota, OPEC's decisions 
or failures to agree have also had a negative effect on the 
state's petroleum industry. A lack of consensus on 
production quotas among OPEC members increased OPEC 
production sharply in the mid 1980's; the world price of 
crude dropped sharply as a result. The result of this 
dissensus in North Dakota was a sharp drop in petroleum 
exploration activities, less money in the economies of the 
affected regions, and fewer dollars collected by the state 
in energy taxes.
Overview of Raw Energy Development in North Dakota
Coal. The coal industry in North Dakota was the 
earliest energy subsector; its development occurred much 
earlier than the state's current energy mainstay, the 
petroleum industry. Lignite coal, a low BTU, low sulfur 
coal that is in abundance in North Dakota is the sector's 
mainstay. North Dakota's coal reserves are extensive and can 
be mined cheaply because of its proximity to the surface. 
Strip mining has been the most economic way to mine the 
state's reserves. Lignite is a low grade coal that is not 
in high demand outside of the immediate producing region.
13
The state's coal in industrial development occurred early in 
the state's history because coal was the main fuel for 
heating at the turn of the century; coal fueled heating 
boilers.22
The significance of the state's coal industry relative 
to other energy subsectors began to decline in the 1950s 
both in its share of employees and its value as a percentage 
of the North Dakota mining industry.23 The most extensive 
use of lignite currently became the thermal electricity 
generating industry. Although the state's coal industry 
declined relative to other energy industries, coal 
production experienced somewhat of a resurgence in the 1970s 
due to the low price of lignite coal.24 The coal industry 
remains strong in the 1980's as well.
Petroleum and Natural Gas Production. Petroleum and 
natural gas extraction as an industry didn't come into the 
forefront as a major contributor to the state's energy 
industry until the discovery of major oil reserves in 1951. 
The peak of North Dakota production since 1951 has been in 
the early 1980s when the value of crude oil was at its 
highest historical point. Petroleum extraction industries 
in this state have been very responsive to the price of
22Scot A. Stradley, The Mineral Industry of North 
Dakota and its Role in the North Dakota Economy. (University 




crude oil as determinant of production. This responsiveness 
of price to production will be further developed in the 
fourth chapter, but the implications of this responsiveness 
is the potential for boom and bust cycles based on world 
price fluctuations.
Natural gas production is closely tied with the 
petroleum production, although this isn't true in all 
natural gas production. Dry natural gas, gas with no 
accompanying liquids, was produced to a very limited extent 
before the 1950s.25 Wet natural gas, gas found in oil 
producing wells, started the North Dakota natural gas 
industry in the 1950s, augmenting petroleum extraction 
development. Increases in the production of natural gas 
closely followed the increase in petroleum production in the 
1960s, and again followed increased petroleum production in 
the 1970s and early 1980s.
Energy's Economic Impact
State-wide Inpact. North Dakota's energy sector 
accounts for a relatively small proportion of the total 
value of economic activity in this state. Mining, of which 
ninety-five percent of this activity come from the energy 
subsectors to be examined in this study,26 accounted for 
only $697 million of North Dakota's gross state product or
25Ibid
26Energy industries include coal mining; thermal 
electric generation; petroleum and natural gas exploration, 
extraction and refining.
15
about 5.5 percent. Gross State Product (GSP) is the value 
of goods and services produced in the state over a period of 
time. For the purposes of this study, GSP is not very 
indicative of energy's impact on the state because its broad 
categories do not separate the subsectors of energy
. , , I I 0 7  , , , , ,production beyond "mining. Thus its inability to isolate
the state's energy sector is diminished. Gross state 
product for North Dakota is included in the appendix. A
measure more indicative of energy's importance in North
• ? ftDakota's economy is brought forth by Randall Coon, et al.
Coon measured aggregate economic activity in North 
Dakota by an input-output model; a different method than the 
gross state product measurement. Coon measured the value of 
economic activity of a number of sectors as a percentage of 
aggregate economic activity in the state by the value of 
final demand for North Dakota products. Table 1.1 presents 
economic activity in North Dakota by sector. Coon's 
statistics indicate that North Dakota's energy industries 
accounted for 15.9 percent of North Dakota economic activity 
in 1984. These statistics demonstrate North Dakota's
07 . . . .Gross state product shows economic activity m  the 
mining sector which includes the raw energy sectors of the state; the utilities section includes electricity 
generation. The problem with these statistics is that the 
statistics cannot be broken down in any more detail to 
effect a more detailed impact of energy in North Dakota's economy.
28Randal Coon, F. Larry Leidtritz, and Thor A. 
Hertsgaard, Composition of North Dakota's Economic Base: a 
Regional Analysis (North Dakota State University:North 
Dakota Agricultural Extension Station: March 1986).
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greater dependence on its energy industries than the measure 
of gross state product where mining accounts for eleven 
percent of the state's economic activity. But energy as a 
major sector of the North Dakota economy does not appear to 
be as significant as Stradley's description of energy as a 
staple. However the regional impacts of energy development 
in North Dakota are very much pronounced.
Regional Economic Impact. Although the North Dakota
energy sector contributed 15.9 percent to North Dakota's
(
economy in 1984, the direct impact of energy is 
regionalized; the western counties of this state are most 
impacted. A map of the North Dakota's eight planning 
districts used in the following discussion is included in 
the appendix.
North Dakota's planning region one, consisting of 
McKenzie, Williams, and Divide Counties, relies more on 
energy activities than any other region in the state. More 
than seventy-two percent of the aggregate economic activity 
in this region was engaged in petroleum extraction, 
exploration, and refining. The economic activity of North 
Dakota Region one is presented in table 1.2 Three other 
regions with significant energy sector activity are 
included in the appendix to illustrate western North 
Dakota's dependence on its energy resources. Tables 1.2 
through 1.5 present the economic activity by sector in the 
regions directly impacted by energy production.
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Table 1.1 Economic Activity by Sector as a Percentage of 
Aggregate Economic Activity in North Dakota, 
1958-1962 Average Compared with 1984.




Agricultural Crops 41.7 32.7 (9.0)
Agricultural Livestock 21.0 9.1 (11.9)
Agricultural Processing 
and Misc. Manuf. 6.5 7.9 1.4
Construction 2.4 1.6 (0.8)
Coal Mining 0.1 1.3 1.2
Households 23.2 29.5 6.3
Petroleum Exploration/ Extraction 1.5 10.0 8.5
Petroleum Refining 1.3 1.5 0.2
Retail Trade and Bus. 
and Prof. Services 2.3 3.3 1.0
Thermal Electric 
Generation 0.0 3.1 3.1
Total 100.0 100.0
Source: Randall Coon, F. 
Hertsqaard. Composition Larry Leidtritz, of North Dakota's
and Thor A. 
Economic Base: A
Regional Analvsis. (North Dakota State University: North 
Dakota Agricultural Extension Service, March 1986)
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Table 1.2 Economic Activity by Sector as a percentage of Aggregate Economic Activity in North Dakota 
Region la, 1958-1962 Average Compared With 1984.
Increase
(Decrease)
Economic Sector 1958-62Average 1984
Between
1958-62 and 1984
Agricultural Crops 26.0 6.3 (19.7)
Agricultural Livestk 14.0 3.5 (10.5)
Ag Processing and 
Misc Manufacturing 3.6 2.0 (1.6)
Construction, Retail 
Trade, Bus and Pers 
Services, Coal Extr . 3.5 1.9 (1.6)
Households 10.7 13.7 3.0
Petroleum Explor/ 
Extract. 35.3 69.1 33.8
Petroleum Refining 6.9 3.5 (3.4)
Totals 100.0 100.0
a. Consists of Mckenzie, Williams and Divide Counties.
Source: Randall Coon, F. Larry Leidtritz, and Thor A. 
Hertsgaard, Composition of North Dakota's Economic Base: A 
Regional Analysis (North Dakota State University: North 
Dakota Agricultural Extension Station, March 1986)
19
Table 1.3 Economic Activity by Sector as a Percentage ofAggregate 
Region 2a,
Economic Activity 
1958-1962 Averagein North Dakota Compared with 1984.




Agricultural Crops 35.2 24.3 (10.9)
Agricultural Livestk 15.1 6.5 (8.6)
Ag Processing and 
Misc Manufacturing 5.8 7.7 1.9
Construction 2.0 1.7 (0.3)
Households 28.7 39.8 11.1
Petroleum Explor/ 
Extraction 10.8 16.6 5.8
Retail Trade,
Personal and Bus. 
Services 2.4 3.4 1.0
Total 100.0 100.0
a. Consists of Burke, Mountrail, Renville, Bottineau, Ward, 
McHenry, and Pierce Counties.
Source: Randall Coon, F. Larry Leidtritz, and Thor A. 
Hertsgaard, Composition of North Dakota's Economic Base: A Regional Analysis. (North Dakota State University: North 
Dakota Agricultural Extension Service, March 1986)
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Table 1.4 Economic Activity by Sector as a Percentage of 
Aggregate Economic Activity in North Dakota 
Region 7a, 1958-1962 Average Compared with 1984.
Increase
(Decrease)1958-62 Between
Economic Sector Average 1984 1958-62 and 1984
Agricutural Crops 22.3 12.9 (9.4)
Agricultural Livestk 28.0 12.5 (15.5)
Ag Processing and 
Misc Manufacturing 6.3 5.6 (0.7)
Coal Mining 0.4 4.6 4.2
Construction 2.5 2.0 (0.5)
Households 17.2 25.3 8.1
Petroleum Refining 21.2 20.8 (0.4)
Retail Trade, Pers. 
Business Services 2.1 2.4 0.3
Thermal Electric 
Generation 0.0 13.9 13.9
Totals 100.0 100.0
a. Consists of McLean, Sheridan, Mercer, Oliver, Kidder, 
Burleigh, Morton, Grant, Emmons, and Sioux Counties.
Source: Randall Coon, F. Larry Leidtritz, and Thor A. 
Hertsgaard, Composition of North Dakota's Economy: A 
Regional Analysis. (North Dakota State University: North 
Dakota Agricultural Extension Service, March 1986)
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Table 1.5 Economic Activity by Sector as a Percentage of Aggregate Economic Activity in North Dakota 
Region 8a, 1958-1962 Average Compared with 1984.
Increase
(Decrease)
Economic Sector 1958-62Average 1984
Between
1958-62 and 1984
Agricultural Crops 41.2 13.4 (27.8)
Agricultural Livestk 36.0 9.8 (26.2)
Ag Processing and 
Misc Manufacturing 4.5 3.4 (1.1)
Coal Mining 0.5 1.9 1.4
Construction 1.9 0.5 (1.4)
Households 11.1 8.9 (2.2)
Petroleum Explor/ 
Extraction 2.4 60.5 58.1
Retail Trade, Persnl 
and Business Serve 2.4 1.6 (0.8)
Totals 100.0 100.0
a. Consists of Dawn, Goldenvalley, Billings, Stark, Slope, 
Hettinger, Bowman, and Adams Counties.
Source: Randall Coon, L. Larry Leidtritz, and Thor A. 
Hertsgaard, Composition of North Dakota's Economic Base: A Regional Analysis. (North Dakota State University: North 
Dakota Agricultural Extension Service, March 1986)
Energy's Employment Generation. Although services and 
government currently account for a great proportion of the 
state's economy, much of these services would not be in 
existence without energy's economic activity and employment 
generation. These dependent sectors are therefore final 
demand linkages under Watkin's staple hypothesis. In 1984 
(the most recent employment data), energy directly employed
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7871 North Dakotans or about two percent of the State's 
workforce of 323,420. The breakdown of employment by 
industry in North Dakota for selected years between 1958 and 
1984 is presented in table 1.6. Employment levels in the 
energy industries alone do not accurately represent the 
impact of energy on employment generation in the state.
This raw data is limited in that it cannot illustrate the 
spread effects caused by energy development.
For example, Halstead and Leistritz studied the 
employment impact of the coal boom on the retail industry in 
Mercer County, North Dakota in terms of the change in the 
number of retail establishments, the number of employees, 
and the total annual payroll.29 During the eight year 
period between 1972 and 1980, corresponding with the coal 
boom, the number of business establishments increased from 
119 to 164 to meet increasing demand caused by the coal 
boom; the number of people employed in those establishments 
subsequently increased from 707 to 1553; and annual payroll 
increased from $3,304,000 to $11,245,521 (in 1972 dollars). 
The preceeding example demonstrates the impact of an 
emerging industry; unfortunately for the state, the decline 
of energy brings less favorable impacts.
2 9John M. Halstead and F. Larry Leistritz, Impacts of 
Energy Development on Mercer County, North Dakota. (Fargo: 
North Dakota Agricultural Extension Service, January 1983).
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Table 1.6 North Dakota Employment by Economic Sector, 
Selected Years 1958-1984
Economic Sector 1958 1964 1974 1984
Agriculture 99,670 78,000 52,670 50,870
Nonmetallic Mining 130 113 137 194
Construction 14,430 15,291 14,869 17,528
Transportation 6,558 6,071 5,874 7,530
Communications and 
Public Utilities 7,995 7,503 7,486 9,546
Agricultural Processing 
and Misc Manufacturing 16,448 19,055 26,022 32,380
Retail Trade 36,400 39,226 46,639 58,358
FIRE 5,070 6,230 7,479 11,242
Business and Personal Services 12,474 15,804 21,387 33,453
Porfessional and 
Social Services 14,067 17,821 24,118 37,725
Government 30,260 38,740 47,527 57,123
Coal Mining 380 349 356 1,557
Thermal Electric 
Generation 60 83 312 646
Petroleum Exploration/ 
Extraction 1,903 1,278 1,033 5,065
Petroleum Refining 335 276 201 203
Totals 246,180 245,840 256,110 323,420
Source: North Dakota Economic Data. (Bismarck: North Dakota 
Economic Development Commission, 1988)
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Tax Dependence. Not only have many regions of the 
North Dakota economy become very dependent on the energy 
industries it possesses, the state government has become 
dependent on the extraction industries for a significant 
proportion of state general fund revenues. Local 
government, including special districts depend on these 
sources of revenue as well.
Recognizing the revenue raising potential of energy 
development, -the North Dakota Legislature enacted several 
laws to tax the production of energy in the past few 
decades. Taxes on energy accounted for an average of 
$205,044,666 for the state general fund in the past three 
bienniums or an average of 17.8 percent of general fund 
revenue collections. The state has experienced a drop in 
those revenues caused mainly by a drop in world oil prices. 
The impacts of these decreased energy tax collections has 
impacted the state's fiscal health; all institutions of 
government in the state have felt this revenue crunch. The 
Government of North Dakota has a stake in the FTA in its 
effect on revenues for both the state as well as local 
governments. Table 1.7 presents the composition of state 
general fund revenues; table 1.8 compares general fund tax 
collections by type as a percentage of total collections. 
Table 1.9 profiles each energy tax, the year enacted, and 
the destination of each taxes' revenues.
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Leases, Transfersa $ 63.637 $ 71.611 $ 47.411
Sales and Use and 
Motor Vehicle 387.131 372.221 473.923
Individual Income 
Tax 150.133 153.518 203.898
Corporate Income 
Tax 125.396 84.382 69.893
Energy Taxes*3 305.769 174.504 134.858
Cigarette and 
Tobacco Taxes 21.268 19.401 28.460
Insurance Premium Tax 22.899 24.499 27.932
Wholesale Liquor 
Tax 11.672 11.420 11.007
Business Privilege 
Tax 2.761 4.872 3.961
Departmental Fees 
and Collections 18.339 21.459 21.276
Total $1109.005 $937,887 $1022.619
a. Includes interest income, mineral leasing fees, Bank of 
North Dakota profits transfer, State Mill profits transfer, 
Gas Tax Administration, and other transfers.
b. Includes the five percent gross production tax, the 6.5 
percent oil extraction taxe (oil and gas production; and the 
coal conversion and coal severance tax.
Source: State and Local Taxes in North Dakota. (Bismarck: 
State Tax Commissioner, January 1989).
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Table 1.8 Comparison of North Dakota Revenue Sources as a 
Percentage of Total General Fund Collections, 1983-85, 1985-87, and 1987-89 Bienniums (Millions of Dollars).







Leases, Transfers 5.7 7.6 4.6
Sales and Use and 
Motor Vehicle 34.9 39.7 46.3
Individual Income 
Tax 13.5 16.4 19.9
Corporate Income 
Tax 11.3 9.0 6.9
Energy Taxes 27.6 18.6 13.2
Cigarette and 
Tobacco Taxes 1.9 2.1 2.8
Insurance Premium 
Tax 2.1 2.6 2.7
Wholesale Liquor Tax 1.1 1.2 1.1
Business Privilege Tax 0.2 0.5 0.4
Departmental Fees 
and Collections 1.7 2.3 2.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: State and Local Taxes in North Dakota. (Bismarck:State Tax Commissioner , January 1989)
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Table 1.9 Energy Taxes in North Dakota 1989: Descriptions 
of Taxes and Beneficiaries of Revenues.
Destination of
Tax Year Enacted Revenue
Coal Severance Tax 1975$0.75/ton in 
lieu of sales 
and use tax and 
property tax
Coal Conversion Tax 1975
Based on installed generating capacity; 
in lieu of property 
tax on the plant
Oil Extraction Tax 1980
6.5% of gross value of crude oil at the 
well head. Oil
Oil and Gas Gross 
Production Tax 19535% on the gross
value at the well­head
Source: State and Local Taxes 
State Tax Department, January
50% to State General 
Fund15% to trust fund 
35% to coal producing counties
65% to State General 
Fund
35% to the county of the plant's location
90% to State General 
Fund10% to Southwest Pipe­
line sinking fund and 
resources trust fund
A split between the 
State General Fund 
and the producing 
County based on tax collections per 
fiscal year
in North Dakota. (Bismarck: 
1989)
Necessity of this Study. The preceeding sections on 
North Dakota's economy have attempted to demonstrate the 
great impact the state's energy resources have on its 
economy. Now that the United States-Canada Free Trade 
Agreement is to be implemented, there is a need to examine 
the impacts of this agreement on the economy of North
Dakota. The FTA has been described as a "win-win" situation
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for both countries.30 But. what will be the effect of the 
FTA on the North Dakota economy? Will there be a great 
effect on the employment levels in North Dakota as a result 
of this deal? Will state collections of energy taxes be 
affected by this deal? If so, how will the state and local 
governments be impacted? The following chapters set out to 
answer these questions.
o QExternal Affairs Canada, The Canada-US Free Trade Agreement.
CHAPTER II
THEORIES OF FREE TRADE
This chapter examines theories of free trade from the 
original advocate of trade, Adam Smith (1776) to the more 
quantitative models of the mid-twentieth century to the 
present. Also included in this chapter is an examination of 
literature devoted to the economic effects of a United 
States-Canada free trade area. Such an examination acts as 
a framework for analyzing the effects of the United States- 
Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA) on the North Dakota 
economy, and more specifically for the purposes of this 
paper, its energy sector.
Classical Trade Theories
Absolute Advantage. The original advocate of trade was 
Adam Smith. In his book The Wealth of Nations. Smith 
attacked the mercantilists view on trade as being selfish 
and without consideration for economic efficiency or long­
term consequences.1 The mercantilist view on trade held 
that a country should try to gain financially any way it
1Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (New York: Random 
House, 1937, first published in 1776). By economic 
efficiency, Adam Smith referred to the efficient use of 
labor in production. Today economic efficiency addresses the uses of capital as well.
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could, usually at the expense of others, and often without 
regard for the aggregate welfare of the inhabitants of the 
mercantilist country itself.2 Further, the most important 
way for a nation to become rich and powerful was to export 
more than it imported.3 Smith argued there was a better way 
to conduct trade that would be beneficial to all involved. 
Even though a country could make short term gains by 
practicing mercantilism, it could reap long term benefits if 
it was cognizant of the efficiency in the use of its 
resources.4 In his arguments Smith studied mercantilists to 
re-evalute a country's motivation for trade for the purpose 
of developing a more efficient basis for trade.
Smith argued that for trade to be economically 
beneficial to a country, that country should produce only 
those goods that it can produce at a lower "real" cost 
relative to other countries. A country should import only 
those commodities that it cannot produce cheaper than other 
countries. Smith referred to real cost as the amount of
2David A. Lake and Jeffry A. Frieden, International 
Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth. 
(New York: St. Martins, 1987).
The difference would be settled by an inflow of precious metals, mostly gold. For further discussion of the 
mercantilist view of trade see Dominick Salvatore, 
International Economics. 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, 
1984); or David A. Lake and Jeffry A. Frieden, International 
Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth. (New York: St. Martins, 1987).
4Ibid.
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labor that is necessary to produce commodities. As Adam 
Smith put it:
The natural advantages which one country has over 
another in producing particular commodities are sometimes so great, that it is acknowledged by all 
the world to be in vain to struggle with them. By 
means of glasses, hotbeds, and hotwalls, very good 
grapes can be raised in Scotland, and very good wine 
can be made of them at about thirty times the 
expense for which at least equally good can be 
bought from foreign countries. Would it be 
reasonable to prohibit the importation of all 
foreign wines, merely to encourage the making of 
claret and burgundy in Scotland? But if there would 
be manifest absurdity in turning towards any employment, thirty times more of the capital and 
industry of the country, than would be necessary to 
purchase from foreign countries, an equal quantity 
of the commodities wanted, there must be an 
absurdity ... in turning towards any such employment 
a thirtieth, or even a three-hundreth part more of 
either. Whether the advantages which one country 
has over another, be natural or aquired, is in this 
respect of no consequence.
Trade would then be undertaken according to the amount 
of labor input into production. For example if product "a" 
of country "1" takes two hours to produce and product "b" of 
country "2" takes four hours to produce, country "1" would 
have to give up two units of commodity "a" to obtain one 
unit of commodity "b." Thus inherent in this discussion is 
a medium for exchange that is currently done with some type 
of currency. Benefits that accrue when a country engages in 
trade are received when a country imports a commodity at a 
lower real cost through trade than through direct production 
at home:
By improving a more extensive market for whatever 
part of the produce of their labor may exceed the 5
5 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations: 424-425.
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home consumption, it [foreign trade] encourages them 
to improve its productive powers, and to augment its annual produce to the utmost.6
Unlike the mercantilist view, a nation engaging in
production based on its absolute advantage does not gain at
the expense of another nation; nations gain simultaneously.
This gain would be achieved only if trade were free of
distortions among countries. Smith argued that governments
shouldn't get involved in regulating trade. If governments
refrain from regulating the free market economy, the result
should be countries taking their respective place in the
production of goods based on absolute advantage.7 8
Smith's absolute advantage theorum addressed only the 
production factor of labor, which does place a limitation on 
his argument. Smith also fails to take into account that 
some nations cannot produce many or even any products more 
efficiently, leaving resources in that country 
underutilized, and the nation's labor force under-employed. 
Thus a disadvantaged nation rationalizes the application of 
tariffs to encourage domestic production as being
• , • oeconomically efficient. But among nations there are a 
number of factor endowments9 that may be unequal and have to
6Ibid, 415.
7Ibid.
8The history of world trade is laden with tariff
applications to encourage less efficient production. For a 
discussion of tariff history as it relates to global power 
see David A. Lake and Jeffry A. Frieden, International 
Political Economy; Perspectives on Global Wealth and Power.
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be taken into consideration. In addressing the weaknesses 
of Smith's theory, David Ricardo takes the theory of 
absolute advantage, embellishes it, and expands the theory 
of trade with his own argument, comparative advantage.
Comparative Advantage. David Ricardo theorized that a 
nation's basis for its production decisions, and ultimately 
its import/export balance, should not be based on absolute 
advantage of production as Adam Smith argued. Ricardo 
argued that comparative advantage relative to production 
possibilities should be the basis for such decisions.10 
Ricardo argues that even if a nation does not enjoy an 
absolute advantage in the production of a commodity, that 
nation would choose to specialize in the commodity that it 
has the least absolute disadvantage in production.11 The 
commodity in which the nation has the least absolute 
disadvantage becomes the commodity in which the nation has a 
comparative advantage to produce. Unlike Smith's absolute 
advantage, the gist of Ricardo's argument is that a nation 
would produce the most efficient product in a disadvantaged 
situation. The nation should also try to import the 
commodity in which its absolute disadvantage is the 
greatest. Attesting to the strength of Ricardo's analysis,
------Q-----------------------------------------------------------------Factor endowments are the natural resources that a country possesses, e.g. land, the quality of its workforce, 
the weather common to an area.
10. .Piero Sraffa, ed. David Ricardo: Works and
Correspondence. (Cambridge, England: University Press for 
the Royal Economic Society, 1951).
1:LIbid.
34
the law of comparative advantage is one of the most famous 
and still largely unchallenged laws of economics, and forms 
the base-line for modern trade theories.^-2
Critique of Classical Theories of Trade. International 
trade theory appears to have grown in small embellishments 
rather than in great leaps and bounds, again attesting to 
the acceptance of Ricardo's arguments. But there has been 
some recent criticism of classical international trade 
theories because of their inability to accurately model 
increasingly complex modern economies. A quiet revolution 
is occuring in international trade. Out of this revolution 
has emerged a quite different way of thinking about 
international trade, one that preserves some of the 
traditional view but calls other parts of the traditional 
view into question. The classical trade theories themselves 
do not address consumer preferences, elasticity of demand, 
capital cost considerations, factor endowments, and thus 
serve only as a reference point in an increasingly complex 
trading world. In analyzing North Dakota's path to economic 
efficiency, we must be cognizant not only of North Dakota's 
comparative advantage based on its factor endowments, but 
also the limits of those endowments.
For example, as North Dakota agricultural production 
began to receive challenges from rival producers, it has had 
to re-evaluate its seemingly absolute advantage in 
agricultural production. Factor endowments have 12
12Paul Krugman, "Rethinking International Trade," Business Economics. April 1988.
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historically leaned in North Dakota's favor. But, with 
North Dakota's factor endowments it still finds advantage in 
agricultural production, and more recently, with the 
discovery of oil in North Dakota, has found advantage in 
extracting petroleum. North Dakota chooses not to produce 
other commodities such as steel in the state because of its 
lack of resources needed to produce steel (with the 
exception of energy) and its disadvantage compared to other 
states.
In analyzing North Dakota's economy, we must ask 
whether it would be economically efficient if it put all 
efforts into agricultural production and energy production 
and forego all other production opportunities because of the 
state's factor endowments. What about the boom and bust 
cycles associated with such a resource-based economy? What 
about a balance of imports and exports in one or both of 
those industries so that North Dakota does discover a 
comparative advantage? The classical theories do not take 
into account the nature of individual economies, and for the 
purpose of this paper, the uniqueness of North Dakota's 
resource-based economy. Thus the classical theories serve 
only as a reference point in discovering efficient economic 
activity in the state. Because economic analysis tends to 
follow the line of least mathematical resistance, the 
traditional approach has been to emphasize country 
differences and deemphasize the advantages of specialization
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• 13 .per se, as reasons for international trade. Recognizing 
the weaknesses of the classical trade theories, the most 
modern trade theories utilize comparative advantage and try 
to explain production in terms of opportunity cost theory. 
This orientation will be used in chapter four to determine 
North Dakota's most efficient production position.
Modern Trade Theories
Constant Costs. Working within the boundaries of 
comparative advantage, a nation in its production decision 
and ultimately in its trading decisions, has to consider the 
marginal rate of transformation among the commodities in its 
production possibility curve.13 4 In the absence of trade, or 
autarky, a nations's production possibilities curve or 
frontier also presents the boundaries of consumption for a 
nation. With trade, a nation can specialize in the 
commodity of its comparative advantage, exchange part if 
this for the commodity of its comparative disadvantage, and 
end up consuming more of both commodities than without 
trade.15 As a nation moves toward specialization in one
13Paul Krugman, "Rethinking International Trade."
14Holly Ulbrich, International Trade and Finance:Theory and Policy. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1983). The marginal rate of transformation is the amount of a 
commodity that a nation must give up producing in order to 
produce more of a second commodity. A nation's production 
possibility curve shows all possible combinations of the two 
commodities that a nation can produce by fully utilizing all 
of its factors of production with the best technology 
available.
1C , , , ,Dominick Salvatore, International Economics. 
(Englewood Cliffs: MaGraw-Hill, 1984).
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commodity, the gains from trade increase as it becomes more 
and more specialized. As long as one nation's production is 
large enough to meet its need for a commodity, that nation 
will not stop short of total specialization.16 Any surplus 
would be available for export in exchange for commodities 
not produced by that nation. In this relatively simple 
model, the nation does not have to face the situation of 
increasing costs or opportunity costs in production 
decisions. Thus trade decisions would be easily and 
accurately made. Unfortunately, production decisions do not 
appear to be so simple.
Increasing Costs. The weakness of the constant costs 
model was pointed out by trade theorists who recognized that 
nations face increasing opportunity costs. The main 
result of replacing the constant cost assumption with 
increasing costs is to explain the real-world phemonenom of 
partial specialization rather than total specialization in 
the production of one commodity.18 The reality of the 
trading situation is that it is more likely for a nation to 
face increasing opportunity costs or an increasing marginal 
rate of transformation in producing more units of a
16Holly Ulbrich, International Trade and Finance:
Theory and Policy.
17For example see A .D. Woodland, International Trade 
and Resource Allocation. (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1982) ; 
or Miltiodes Chacholiades, Principles of International 
Economics. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981).
no , , ,Holly Ulbrich, International Trade and Finance:
Theory and Policy.
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commodity. The increasing amounts of one commodity that a 
nation must give up in order to release just enough 
resources to produce each additional unit of another 
commodity illustrates increasing costs. At a point on a 
nation's production possibility curve, the nation's 
production of its chosen commodity will equal the cost of 
the imported commodity. Thus production should be set at 
this point. Because of the typical slope of the production 
possibilities curve, a nation gains less and less as it 
specializes further relative to the commodity it chooses to 
import.19 Thus there is a need to determine the most 
efficient production level, which is by no means an easy 
task.
Heckscher-Ohlin Theory (H-0). This theory focuses on 
the difference in relative factor endowments and the price 
of factors between nations as the most important 
determinants of efficient production and trade.
Agricultural producers (such as North Dakota) require an 
endowment of fertile land, adequate rainfall, and weather. 
The H-0 theorum postulates that each nation will export the 
commodity intensive in its relatively abundant and cheap 
factor, and import the commodities intensive in its 
relatively scarce and expensive factor.20 Although very 
similar to comparative advantage, what H-0 doesn't explain 
is why North Dakota's export markets choose North Dakota's
19Ibid.
9 n ,Dominick Salvatore, International Trade.
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products versus other suppliers in situations where prices 
are similar. And further, H-0 takes into account only 
natural resources of a nation (for instance crude oil). 
However, a significant proportion of production is not 
affected by climate or natural resources, e.g. the garment 
industry, and thus the theory is somewhat limited in its 
applicability.
Factor Price Equalization Theorem. Developed as a 
corollary to-Heckscher-Ohlin Theory, this theory postulates 
that reducing barriers to trade will lead to the elimination 
or reduction in the pre-trade difference in relative and 
absolute factor prices between nations. This situation is 
borne out because:
When protection is removed, demand for the abundant factor will increase and demand for the scarce 
resource will decrease, raising the price of the abundant factor and lowering the price of the scarce 
factor. Thus, the return of the two factors of 
production will tend to converge. These two 
converges as a result of trade are known as factor 
price equalization.21 *
This extension of H-0 was necessary because H-0 fails to 
explain a substantial portion of international trade; for 
instance, trade in similar but not identical products, e.g. 
American versus German automobiles.
A second factor ignored by H-0 that has to be taken 
into account in a nation's production decision is the 
potential for economies of scale.  ̂ Economies of scale
21Holly Ulbrich, International Trade and Finance:Theory and Policy.
O p Dominick Salvatore, International Trade.
40
refers to a situation in which output grows proportionately 
more than the increase in the use of input or factors of 
production. If a country takes economies of scale into 
consideration in its production and trading decisions, 
resources will theoretically be better utilized.
A third factor ignored by H-0 are technological gaps 
and their relationship to product cycles. A great deal of 
exports of industrial nations are based on the introduction 
of new materials and new production processes. A nation may 
produce in an unchallenged manner, at least at first 
development of the technology. This occurs until the have- 
not countries copy the technology and undersell the nation 
that introduced the technology.23 But when will the nation 
copying the technology be in a position to produce more 
efficiently than the nation introducing the technology?
This situation is more difficult to calculate.
A fourth factor that must be considered are the costs 
associated with the transportation of goods to the export 
market. A commodity will be traded only if the pre-trade 
price difference between the two nations exceeds the cost of 
transporting it between them. In addition, when trade is in 
equilibrium, the price of the traded commodity in the 
importing nation exceeds the price of the same commodity in 
the exporting nation by the cost of transportation.24
23Ibid.
24A.D. Woodland, International Trade and Resource 
Allocation (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1982).
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Hechscher-Ohlin theory neglects transportation, and in 
analyzing North Dakota's position in the North American 
market, the transportation of commodities to final markets 
is an important consideration.
Two other important factors which must also be taken 
into account in the analysis of trade are alluded to in the 
factor price equilization theory: changes in taste and 
changes in supply. When a nation changes its taste for a 
commodity and seeks substitute products, the pure efficiency 
argument of production becomes distorted. A similar 
situation applies to a shortage of supply. When the price 
of a commodity is perfectly inelastic25 6 to change in price, 
e.g. there is a taste preference for the commodity in short 
supply, efficient trade will be adversely affected. Thus as 
an analysis of trade in energy between North Dakota and 
Canada is undertaken, the preference and consumption 
patterns relative to energy cannot be ignored. The patterns 
of supply in a tariff-free trading situation (the current 
U.S.-Canada energy situation) may follow rational economic 
efficiency. The challenge is to discover the rationale for 
the current North Dakota-Canada energy trading relationship, 
which does not necessarily follow the path of greatest 
economic efficiency.
25Ibid.
26When the price of a commodity is perfectly inelastic, 
demand for that commodity will not change regardless of 
increases or decreases in the commodity's price.
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Analysis of Normative Trade Theories
Countries trade for a number of reasons. The main 
reason that a nation engages in trade is that it is to a 
country's advantage to do so; nations benefit from trade. 
When a country specializes in producing certain products and 
relies on other countries to produce other products for 
importation, resources can theoretically be allocated in a 
more efficient and productive manner in each of the 
countries.27 * The complicating factors to a seemingly simple 
analysis are the non-economic motivations for trade, or lack 
of trade. For instance, nations may trade for cultural 
reasons, or may patronize local production without regard 
for economic efficiency.
The scholars previously mentioned, with the exception 
of Adam Smith, all argued that free trade, in which each 
country would look for its comparative advantage and produce 
accordingly, would result in the most efficient use of 
resources and would benefit each country involved. The 
desirability of free trade is one economic condition that 
almost all economists agree on. More specifically, the 
theory of comparative advantage remains one of the least 
challenged laws in economics. ° However, given the 
complexity of modern economies, the historic belief in the 
classical theories of free trade are waning somewhat, giving
P 7 • •James C. Ingram International Economics 2nd ed. (New
York: Wiley 1986).
90 , fPaul Krugman, "Rethinking International Trade."
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way to more modern theories that deal with a number of more 
complicated variables and more complex analytical 
techniques.
Unlike the theory of comparative advantage, which 
emphasizes that countries specialize in order to take 
advantage of their differences, a more recent alternative 
view attributes trade to the inherent advantages of 
specialization or trade based on increasing returns.
Because comparative advantage is much more easily placed 
into a mathematical formula than is increasing returns,
• • • 9 Qincreasing returns has been less widely acknowledged.
The central notion of normative trade theories is that 
there are gains from trade and free trade is pareto-superior 
to any system containing tariffs.29 30 The question addressed 
by the modern trade theories is the net benefit of a free 
trade zone for the whole of the country, as each part of the 
country will contribute to the aggregate result. But as the 
pareto criterion points out if a net benefit is the result 
of free trade, this will be desirable regardless of the 
costs to the individual parts of the country. This is the 
danger to a state such as North Dakota which doesn't have 
the resources or the political clout to protect its own 
interests regardless of any potential negative consequences
29Ibid.
30Samuelson, P.A. "The Gains from International Trade", 
5 Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science. 1939: 
195-205. A pareto superior situation refers to a situation 
in which a country as a whole would gain economically from a strategy.
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of the actions of the remainder of the union. Free trade
per se, thus is not the panacea that was pronounced in the
older theories of international trade for regions "falling
through the cracks" in the name of economic efficiency. New
trade theories take into account a much more complex world,
including many factor endowments:
The new free trade position ... is not the same as 
the old. Instead of advocating free trade as part of 
a blanket endorsement of free markets, today's international economists advocate it as a reasonable 
rule of thumb in an imperfect world. 1
Thus as scholars, politicians, and laymen consider the
impacts of removing barriers to trade, we are not only
concerned with a gain for aggregate welfare, but with the
impact on "pet" sectors and the politics that accompany the
protection of those sectors. Unfortunately the inability to
model complex economies given these non-economic
considerations places a limitation on our ability to
generalize among individual sectors.
Perspectives on a U.S.-Canada Free Trade Area 
There have been numerous attempts to explore the 
potential effects of a U.S.-Canada free trade area. The 
orientation of most of these studies has been to determine 
the gains or losses of aggregate welfare incurred by an 
economy as a result of the reduction of tariffs, and in some 
cases, nontariff barriers. Unfortunately, there has been 
relatively little study on the economic effects of the 31
31Paul Krugman, "Rethinking International Trade."
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current U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement. What study there 
has been has relied heavily on the more general welfare 
effects of the FTA on the American and Canadian economies. 
The weakness of these studies lies in the accurate modeling 
of each nation's economy. Although each researcher is 
careful to point out the limitations of his/her model, the 
results of this research has to be taken with appropriate 
caveats. Unfortunately one of the most important factors in 
determining the effects of an economic policy is also one of 
the most complex: the quantifying of individual and group 
behavior (non-economic variables). The problem becomes one 
of accurately modeling and quantifying this behavior within 
an economic model. None of the following studies adequately 
addresses consumer behavior, granted however, that consumer 
preference is extremely difficult to accurately quantify.
A second limitation of the analyses of U.S.-Canada free 
trade is that many of the studies have been undertaken to 
estimate empirically the gains to only parts of each 
country's economy from various forms of trade 
liberalization. We must also utilize these findings with 
the appropriate caveats in generalizing to other sectors 
because many of these studies have limited data and missing 
data. The models are very limited in their ability to 
accurately portray the Canadian and American economies with 
a partial equilibrium analysis as a result. ^
32John Whalley, ed. Canada-U.S. Free Trade. (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1985). A partial equilibrium
analysis considers only a portion of the economy rather the
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A third limitation of utilizing the research to make 
generalizations to an individual sector is the orientation 
of the researcher him/herself. There are numerous 
theoretical perspectives to the modeling the American and 
Canadian economies. Results of the analyses are many times 
contingent on the assumptions of the nature of each 
country's economy. Presented in this section are the 
highlights of the research on a free trade area, along with 
an attempt to make sense out of the differing modeling 
perspectives. Chapter four will utilize these economic 
perspectives in the analysis of the FTA as a framework for 
North Dakota energy industries. Some of these perspectives 
are alluded to, some are explicitly applied.
An American-Canadian Economic Union - Wannacot and 
Wannacot. One of the most complete and respected economic 
analyses of an American-Canadian economic union was put 
forth by Ronald and Paul Wannacot in 1967.33 This study 
modeled the American and Canadian manufacturing economies to 
determine the effects on both the American and Canadian 
economies as well as the impact of bilateral free trade on 
each country's economic sovereignty.
The major finding of the study is that Canada would be 
the big winner with tariff elimination because of economies
entire economy of a nation, thus making the analysis easier 
while at the same time placing a limitation on the utility of the model.
3 3Ronald Wonnacot and Paul Wonnacot, Free Trade Between 
the United States and Canada: The Potential Economic Effects 
(Cambridge, Massachusets: Harvard University Press, 1967).
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of scale considerations. Canada's guaranteed market (its 
internal market) is small relative to the size of the U.S. 
market. By gaining more complete access to the U.S. market, 
Canada would increase its marketing base tenfold. The gap 
in productivity performance between Canadian and American 
manufacturing would narrow considerably and perhaps be 
eliminated under bilateral free trade.34 The important 
qualification made by Wonnacot and Wonnacot is that gains 
from tariff elimination would not be quickly realized. The 
longer the time horizon considered, the higher the expected 
gains would be. In a subsequent assessment of the potential 
impacts of a free trade arrangement between Canada and the 
United States, Ronald Wonnacot estimated that Canada would 
be the winner with total gains expected from a free trade 
arrangement to be 8.2% of pre-agreement gross national 
product.35 The United States would gain little, if any, 
from a free trade arrangement.36
Williams f1978). In a multisectoral analysis of the 
Canadian and American economies and the determinants for 
gains from tariff elimination, Williams found that 
industries that would expand and benefit under free trade 
are the ones which share at least some of the following 
characteristics: they face a relatively high tariff; they
34Ibid.
35Ronald J. Wonnacot, Canada/United States Free Trade: Problems and Opportunities. (Ottawa: Ontario Ecnomic Council, 1985).
36Ibid.
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receive little protection from a domestic tariff; they have 
higher input costs due to the existance of the tariff; and 
they produce more end products.37 Williams concludes that 
the joint removal of tariffs in Canada and the United States 
would favor end-product manufacturing, but not raw resource 
development.38 William's prediction of gains to the 
American and Canadian economies as a result of the removal 
of current tariffs on tariff-affected, manufactured goods 
would preclude North Dakota energy or other energy for that 
matter. Raw energy and electricity currently face no 
tariffs or receive no protections from existing domestic 
tariffs. Thus North Dakota's energy sector would not be 
affected if William's assumptions are valid.
Canada as a Price Taker. The price taker model has 
been a popular model to determine welfare effects of a 
Canada-U.S. free trade area. An important variable in 
determining the effects of the FTA is the nature of Canada 
as a trading country versus the United States; i.e. is 
Canada a price taking nation? The price taker theory 
assumes that a large country would have the ability to 
affect the world price of a commodity because of the sheer 
market size of that country. A small country, without the 
means to manipulate the price of a commodity is considered
37James R. Williams, Resources. Tariffs and Trade; 
Ontario's Stake (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978) .
38Ibid.
49
to be a price taker.39 The limitation of this model is that 
the welfare implications of the model do not hold if rest- 
of-the-world prices change as a consequence of a U.S.-Canada 
free trade agreement.40
If Canada is a price taker, Hill and Whalley argue that 
American aggregate welfare in a free trade agreement would 
decline while Canadian aggregate welfare would increase.41 
The small country (Canada) would experience a "terms of 
trade" effect; i.e. the country imposing the tariff
t
effectively taxes producers in the exporting country. The 
actions of the "large" (American) economy may affect the 
prices of the traded goods, whereas the actions of the 
smaller country (Canada) in levying a tariff puts the 
producers of the large country at a distinct production 
disadvantage when the tariffs are removed because the 
smaller country would already have production facilities in 
place to supply the trade markets.42 The extent of the gain
39Drusilla K. Brown and Robert M. Stern "A Modeling Perspective," in Stern, Tretize and Whalley, Perspectives on 
a Free Trade Agreement. (Washington: The Brookings 
Institution, 1987).
40Ibid.
41Roderick Hill and John Whalley, "Introduction: Canada-U.S. Free Trade," in John Whalley, ed., Canada-United 
States Free Trade (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1985) .
42Earl H. Fry, "Trends in Canada-U.S. Free Trade 
Discussions: 1911-1986, in A.R. Riggs and Tom Velk, 
Canadian-American Free Trade: Historical. Political and Economic Dimensions (Halifax: Institute for Research on 
Public Policy, 1987).
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in the Canadian economy and the loss in the American economy 
is contingent on the individual research.
The reason for the behavior of a price taking country 
does not vary within the research, however. First, it must 
be assumed that Canada imports from the United States at the 
world price. The price that Canadian consumers must pay for 
a commodity eguals the world price plus the tariff imposed 
by Canada. Canada exports to the U.S. at the world price, 
although U.S. consumers pay the world price plus the U.S. 
tariff. The effect on aggregate welfare becomes prevelant 
when the tariffs are removed.43
After the removal of Canadian tariffs, the price of 
American imports into the Canadian market falls by the 
amount of the former Canadian tariff. Imports rise as a 
result and Canadian consumers receive the price and 
efficiency benefits of the trade creation.44 Canada now 
exports to the U.S. at the U.S. domestic price (the world 
price plus the U.S. tariff which still applies to all 
imports except those from Canada). Canada's producers thus 
retain tariff revenue that otherwise would have been 
collected by the U.S. government.45 Canadian terms of trade
43Roderick Hill and John Whalley, "Introduction: Canada-U.S. Free Trade.
44Drusilla K. Brown and Robert Stern, "A Modeling Perspective."
A R^JEarl H. Fry, "Trends in Canada-U.S. Free Trade Discussions."
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and Canadian welfare are therefore improved with a free 
trade arrangement.
In contrast to the Canadian gain in welfare, the U.S. 
is made worse off. Commodities from the rest of the world 
trade are still subject to the U.S. tariff. At the same 
time, the United States will have shifted some impacts from 
low-cost rest-of-the-world suppliers to higher cost Canadian 
suppliers (compared to other countries). u This diversion 
of trade reduces U.S. welfare.46 7 The reason for this drop 
in welfare is directly related to the distorting effect of 
tariffs on trade. Producers from world markets remain 
theoretically more efficient, but the removal of tariffs on 
Canadian goods while maintaining tariffs on other foreign 
goods makes Canadian goods look more efficiently produced 
based on price, but this actually isn't the case. The 
creation of a free trade area could actually harm both 
countries, however.
If rest-of-the-world prices change as a consequence of 
the free trade area, the Canadian increase in aggregate 
welfare will not be realized. If Canada is a price taker, 
Dauphin argues that both American and Canadian trade would 
actually decline in the world market if a free trade 
arrangement takes force.48 But this situation would be
46Roderick Hill and John Whalley, "Introduction: 
Canada-U.S. Free Trade."
47Ibid.
A O tRoma Dauphin, The Impact of Free Trade on Canada 
(Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1978).
52
reversed when: (1) Supply of American goods on the world 
market falls, thus raising its price; and (2) American 
demands for imports from the rest of the world would decline 
(causing a fall in price).49 On both accounts the U.S. 
terms of trade would improve at the expense of its trading 
partners. If the FTA does cause other countries to engage 
in trade liberalization in the multilateral trading system 
as appears to be one of the motivations of the U.S. in 
reaching the FTA, then perhaps the welfare losses will be 
reversed with aggregate welfare gain for the United States 
economy. Thus the welfare gains would be a sound motivation 
for seeking a free trade agreement with Canada, if Canada is 
indeed a price taker.
Product Differentiation. A substantial body of 
literature is devoted to this type of analysis.50 The 
findings of this research continually point to Canadian 
gains from a free trade arrangement. The product 
differentiation effect occurs when the large country, in 
this case the United States, is adversely affected if trade 
is diverted from the small country, Canada. Similarly, 
Canada will gain if it trades exclusively with the United
r  *iStates. 1 But if both countries continue to trade to the
49Drusilla K. Brown and Robert M. Stern, "A Modeling Perspective."
See for example Eitan Berglas, "Preferential Trading 
Theory: The n Commodity Case," 87 Journal of Political Economy. April 1979; or Richard G. Lipsey, The Theory of 
Customs Unions: A General Equilibrium Analysis (London: 
Weidenfelt and Nicholson, 1970).
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same extent or increase their exports in the world market 
after a free trade arrangement, both may lose relative to 
aggregate welfare.5 2 The reasons for this loss in welfare 
are two fold.
First, a selected tariff reduction will remove 
distortion between domestic goods and imports from the 
associated trading partner, which is welfare improving. But 
a new distortion is introduced between imports from the 
preferred country (when produced less efficiently) and those 
from third countries (when produced more efficiently). 
Removing one distortion while creating another distortion 
does not necessarily improve welfare.53 * Complete tariff 
removal by one trade partner will give optimal results only 
if demand for the import from third countries is completely 
independent of the price of the import from the preferred 
partner. This demand may be affected by consumer 
preferences, elasticity of demand, and supply 
considerations.
This first qualification of welfare loss is somewhat 
complicated because all countries can have some control over
5iAlthough the United States trades with other
countries other than Canada, Canada is the dominant trading 
partner and would be near to this exclusivity requirement, 
thus this situation would point to Canadian gains.
“̂ Paul S. Armmgton, "A Theory of Demand for Products 
Distinguished by Place of Production," IMF Staff Papers vol
16 March 1969 quoted in Stern, Trezise, and Whalley, 
Perspectives on a Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement.




their export prices by altering tariffs on imports. For 
example, a tariff reduction on Canadian imports from the 
U.S. will displace domestically produced goods in favor of 
imports. As the price of Canadian goods falls on the world 
market Canada's terms of trade deteriorates. On the other 
hand, a tariff reduction on U.S. imports from Canada will 
allow Canadian penetration of the U.S. market. The increase 
in U.S. demand for Canada's exports will raise the price of 
the Canadian-produced goods on the world market, thus 
improving the terms of trade.55 The welfare effect for 
Canada thus depends on the relative importance of the trade 
creation and import penetration effects that will be 
associated with tariff changes between the two countries.
The second reason for a loss of welfare is based on the 
relative size of the two countries and its increasing 
importance compared with other traditional models.56 A 
unilateral removal of Canadian tariffs on imports would 
deteriorate Canada's terms of trade. Multilateral free 
trade, on the other hand, would give Canada significant 
welfare gains. For example, using tariff and non-tariff 
data from 1977, Hamilton and Whalley used product 
differentiation to determine the effects of bilateral 
removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers (NTBs).57 They
55Ibid.
56Ibid.
57Bob Hamilton and John Whalley, "Geographically 
Discriminatory Trade Arrangments," 67 Review of Economics and Statistics (August 1985).
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found that the bilateral removal of tariffs and NTBs would 
result in increases in welfare for both countries. The size 
of the gain would be contingent on the differing levels of 
initial tariff protection before tariff elimination. The 
U.S. could expect higher gains from a country with highly 
protected, newly industrializing economies that have 
significantly higher levels of protection for domestic 
industries.58
Hamilton and Whalley's study finds that given the above 
conditions for gains in welfare, the U.S. would gain and 
Canada would lose from a free trade agreement. Canada would 
be a loser because its tariffs are significantly higher on 
average than the are American tariffs. Canada's aggregate 
welfare would also decline with a free trade arrangement 
because Canada's terms of trade would decline usurping the 
benefits of trade creation from tariff reductions. Hamilton 
and Whalley's analysis is not sectorally-based, however. It 
is a general equilibrium analysis of the aggregate economies 
of both countries.
Scale Economies and Perfect Competition. A third area 
of knowledge in predicting the impact of a free trade 
arrangement between the U.S. and Canada is directly 
concerned with the presence or the potential to create 
economies of scale in production. It has generally been 
agreed among free trade scholars that the United States 
economy has established economies of scale for its domestic
58Ibid.
56
market because of the sheer volume of goods that are
. • , , , RQproduced in this country for consumption in this country.
The fact that the United States has the sheer number of 
comsumers to make the production of goods and services more 
efficient creates economies of scale even without 
international trade. u The most pressing issue in the free 
trade debate thus becomes Canada's ability to achieve 
economies of scale by having unimpeded access to the larger
American market and the effect on American production.
(
Brown and Stern argued that Canada's historical import 
restrictions have resulted in inefficient Canadian 
production as indicated by suboptimal plant size, production 
short runs, and excessive product diversity.59 *61 Adding to 
the problem of Canada's historically inefficient mode of 
production is the presence of American trade barriers.
Those barriers are in the market most important to Canadian 
producers who try to maximize efficiency by exporting excess 
production to the U.S. Brown and Stern provided a caveat in 
their examination of tariff elimination in the Canadian and 
American economies: it is not possible to prove that a 
country will gain from trade liberalization when economies 
of trade are present. The reason for this cautious finding
59For example see Drusilla Brown and Robert Stern, "A Modeling Perspective"; or Bob Hamilton and John Whalley, 
"Geographically Discriminatory Trade Arrangements."
f t 0 For example see Drusilla Brown and Robert M. Stern,
"A Modeling Perspective."
61Drusilla K. Brown and Robert M. Stern, "A Modeling
Prespective."
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is that other factors exist in an economy such as comsumer 
preference, the elasticity of demand, and the presence of 
imperfect competition created by the presence of monopolies 
and oligopolies.62 Other advocates of the FTA argue that 
tariff reduction will permit Canadian firms to realize 
economies of scale that were not otherwise available.63
Cox and Harris divised a model to test for the effects 
of creating economies of scale in the American-Canadian 
market place and found that welfare gains for Canada would 
be positive, but the gains would be much lower for Canada 
than the product differentiation or the price taker model 
had indicated.64 The gains in Canadian welfare would result 
through three channels. First, tariff reductions would 
result in greater Canadian penetration in the American 
market. Second, lower prices in Canada would force Canadian 
producers to produce more efficiently, which would lower 
prices and force greater efficiency in the use of capital 
and factor endowments. Third, the extent of the results 
would depend on perceived elasticity of demand.65 If demand 
for an American product is near perfect elasticity, then the
62Ibid.
63For example see Elhanan Helpman and Paul Krugman, 
Market Structure and Foreign Trade: Increasing Returns, 
Imperfect Competition and the International Economy (MIT Press, 1985).
64David Cox and Richard Harris, "Trade Liberalization
and Industrial Organization: Some Estimates for Canada," 93 
Journal of Political Economy (February 1985).
65Ibid.
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Canadian gain from tariff reduction will be maximized. 
Conversely, the gain will be minimized if demand for a 
product is inelastic.
Reviewing literature on economies of scale shows there 
has been a fair amount of disagreement of the effects of 
scale economies and gains from trade by Canadian 
producers.66 The Cox-Harris model projected real income 
increases for Canadians at about nine percent with 
employment to rise about five percent.67 Wilkinson points 
out that appropriate caveats have to be made in interpreting 
these results. The nine percent gains in real income in 
Canada is predicated on the Americans and Canadians having 
unimpeded access to each other's markets in all sector 
markets. Given the fact that the FTA does not provide for 
free trade in all sectors and does not clearly address 
existance of subsidies and other non-tariff barriers, the 
gains have to be re-evaluated. Wilkinson reduces the 
expected gains to about two to three percent in Canadian 
aggregate income. As far as limiting the usefulness of
f t  f t For a more complete discussion, see Allan M. Maslove 
and Stanley L. Winer, eds. Knocking on the Back Door: 
Canadian Perspectives on the Political Economy of Freer 
Trade with the United States. Halifax: The Institute for Research on Public Policy (1987) or Paul Krugman "Rethinking 
International Trade," Business Economics. April 1988.
C *7David Cox and Richard Harris, "Trade Liberalization and Industrial Organization: Some Estimates for Canada."
f  O fBruce B. Wilkinson, "Canada-United States Free Trade: 
Setting the Dimensions," in Allan Maslove and Stanley Winer, Knocking on the Back Door.
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employment gains by a large-scale model, Cornell argues that 
large scale models are more appropriate for determining the 
effects on individual sectors of the economy, but are 
relatively weak in determining the effects for the economy 
as a whole. u The weakness in the modeling is the inability 
of the model to take into account the traditional 
consumption patterns and idioscracies of each sector in the 
economy. The question then becomes how has an absence of 
tariff situation affected scale economies in trade in 
energy?
A further contribution to the determination of scale 
economy effects of a free trade arrangement on the American 
and Canadian economies was made by Brown and Stern. The 
method of this study was to model the world economy using 
four regions: Canada, the U.S., a group of the remaining 
world industrial countries, and the rest of the world's 
countries. The findings of this study illustrate the 
complex nature of the world trading system. First, the 
results indicate that a free trade arrangement would result 
in a small increase in welfare for the United States, but 
there would be no change in Canada's aggregate welfare.* 702
cruce iT! Wilkinson. Canada-United States Free Trade: 
Setting the Dimensions, in Allan Maslove and Stanley Winer, 
Knocking on the Back Door
70Peter Cornell, In Support of Trade Liberalization: A
Comment on Bruce B. Wilkinson's Paper in Maslove and Winer, Knocking on the Back Door.




Canada does not gain with a free trade arrangement because 
removal of comparatively high Canadian tariffs reduces total 
demand for Canadian-produced goods. Equilibrium is restored 
by a fall in the price of Canadian goods and a depreciation 
of the Canadian dollar. There would also be very little 
change (less than one percent) change in sectoral employment 
in all sectors. There would be some employment dislocation 
in particular sectors, especially in Canada, but this 
dislocation would be moderated if the free trade arrangement 
were phased in over a period of time.73
Secondly, imports and exports for both the U.S. and 
Canada show increases in intra-industry trade for most 
sectors but not all. For the U.S., the sectors that would 
experience gains are agriculture, petroleum products, and 
transportation equipment; for Canada, footware, petroleum 
products, and transportation equipment. The effects on the 
total output of each economy is expected to be very small, 
as all sectors would show output effects of less than one 
percent. Output would rise in the U.S. and fall in Canada 
in food and kindred products, textiles, printing and 
publishing, chemicals, glass products, metal products, 
electric machinery, and several non-tradables. The opposite 
occurs in wood products, petroleum products, nonferous 




Conclusion of the Computational Models. The preceding 
dicussion of computation models can be easily summed up as 
to the value for application to the problem at hand, the 
analysis of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement. The 
differing orientations of these models leaves us some 
concern as to their utility in predicting the effect of a 
free trade arrangement specifically on the energy sector of 
the United States, let alone North Dakota's energy sectors. 
None of the quantitative studies looked specifically at the 
ramifications for American and Canadian energy production. 
Few of the quantitative observations mentioned energy, and 
where energy was mentioned, the discussion was brief and 
limited to petroleum products and not raw petroleum, natural 
gas, coal, or the sale of electricity. The literature is 
less helpful for the analysis in chapter four as a result. 
But there are three important questions that must be asked 
at this point. First, since no tariffs on energy existed 
before the FTA, will the signing of the agreement itself 
change trade behavior? If the preceding literature is 
accurate, the implications should be limited. Secondly, 
related to the existance of nontariff barriers, did scale 
economies have the opportunity to exist prior to the FTA 
given the tariff in the energy situation? Thirdly, will 
the implementation of a free trade agreement, provide a 
truly free trade situation between the U.S. and Canada? The
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nature of trade within the countries themselves as a model
for free trade suggests that it won't:
One hundred and sixteen years of free trade in 
manufacturing in Canada (with the exception of 
provincial procurement practices) have not produced 
the equality of productivity by industry across the country within the limits that transportation costs 
allow. Why, then, should we expect free trade with 
the United States will change this? In short, 
whether we are considering productivity 
improvements, the pace of technological advance or 
other aspects of meeting foreign competition, a host 
of domestic traditions, customs, business pratices, 
and institutions will have to be dealt with as well. 
Free Trade alone is not enough. 5
Limiting the benefits of an FTA: Sunk Costs and Trade. 
James Markusen considered the arguments of Wonnacot and 
Wonnacot and added a consideration conspicuously absent from 
their analysis, sunk costs. It is assumed by Wonnacot and 
Wonnacot, et al., that any change in trade liberalization 
would result in some firms entering and possibly others 
leaving the market until a new zero profit equilibrium was
. 77  . . . . .achieved. Further it was implicit in Wonnacot and 
Wonnacot that any firm with superior technology would enter, 
and by pricing at average cost, could force an existing less 
efficient firm to sell its assets and exit from the *7
75B.W. Wilkinson in John Whalley Canada-U.S. Free Trade
7 ft'°James R. Markusen, "Canadian Gains from Trade in the 
Presence of Scale Economies and Imperfect Competition," in 
John Whalley, Canada-United States Free Trade (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1986).
7 7'Ronald Wonnacot and Paul Wonnacot, Free Trade Between 
the United States and Canada. A zero profit equilibrium is 
achieved when firms engaged in production would preclude 
additional firms entering production from breaking even, let alone making a profit.
63
industry. Markusen argues that both assumptions must be 
modified if a firm's investments are sunk costs, that is, if 
investments are for various reasons irrecoverable or have 
very little market value should the firm choose to exit from
• 7 8production.
Further, Markusen argues that when costs are sunk, 
existing firms have an advantage over new entrants even if 
the latter have better technology or entrepreneurial 
expertise. Potential entrants know that existing firms will 
price down to marginal cost before exiting, which may imply 
that entry is deterred. Sunk costs thus give first entrants 
a strategic advantage and may imply positive long-run 
profits for those firms, while at the same time distorting
• • . . • 70efficient production associated with free trade.
Related to Markusen's sunk costs argument, Rodrique 
Trembley addressed the possibility of abrogation of a free 
trade agreement with its six month termination clause and 
its implications for trade behavior because of sunk costs.
He writes that short term termination notices place Canadian 
industry at a distinct disadvantage and thus would limit 
gains because of sunk cost considerations: "Canadian 
industries cannot rationalize and specialize for a large 
continental market if (the market situation) cannot change 
dramatically in ... 180 days."80 It appears that potential 7*
7 8James R. Markusen, "Canadian Gains from Trade in thePresence of Scale Economies and Imperfect Competition."
79 Ibid.
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gains from tariff reduction are thus limited directly to the
presence of sunk cost considerations.
Utility of the Models. When applying the models to the
North Dakota energy sector, we have to be aware that these
models are very limited in their applicability:
Economic models are not by any means satisfactory.
But the modellers themselves are usually the first 
to point out that their results are only a rough 
guide and that they depend on some key background 
assumptions and, of course, on the structure of the 
particular model. 1
None of these models addressed the subsectors of energy 
industries that resembles North Dakota's energy industries. 
Thus the economic argument is difficult to settle. We have 
to be careful about interpreting the models and analyses for 
North Dakota's energy sector as a result. The available 
sectoral research is sketchy at best, and much of it can be
• Q Ochallenged on methodological grounds. Nonetheless, the 
information provided by these models and analyses will be 
utilized with the appropriate caveats.
Equally important is the question of the applicability 
of general equilibrium models to individual sectors. As the 
economies in this world become more complex, the economic 
literature becomes somewhat second best because of the
-------------------- O -r-j------------------ ;------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ;-----------------------------------------Rodnque Trembley "Adjustment Concerns during the 
Transition to North American Free Trade" in Murray Smith and 
Frank Stone Assessing the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. 
(Halifax: The Institute for Research on Public Policy,1987). 81
81Peter Cornell, In Support of Trade Liberalization
O O  #Denis Stairs, Non Economic Implications of a 
Comprehensive Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement in Maslove 
and Winer, Knocking on the Back Door
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limitations of the models and the many conditions that are
deemed necessary to ensure welfare maximization. Most
obviously, the models do not take into account the effects
of government intervention into the economy (which will
continue to an extent under this free trade agreement):
Because of the fact that perfect competition rarely 
exists, it cannot be assumed that all marginal 
social costs and benefits are equal in every segment 
of the economy.83
A third drawback to the utility of the economic models 
is the neglect of the models to address the prevalence of 
nontariff barriers and subsidies. A subsidy can be devised 
to replicate the economic effects of a tariff. From an 
economic perspective, a subsidy acts very much like a tariff 
but in a negative way.84 The subsidy thus operates to 
encourage less efficient production than a free market 
without such distortions would encourage.
Given the limitations of the models presented, and the 
uniqueness of the North Dakota energy sector, we must next 
look at North Dakota-Canada trade in energy and examine the 
provisions of the FTA. Chapter three takes this orientation 
and also looks at the potential stability of the agreement 
as an aid in determining its economic effects.
83Gilles Pacquet, Elegant But Not Helpful to 
Navigation: Social Science Research and the Free Trade 
Debate in Maslove and Winer, Knocking on the Back Door
04 . #Michael J. Trebilcock, Can We Become Better Losers?: 
The Problem of Divesting from Declining Sectors, in Maslove 
and Winer, Knocking on the Back Door
Chapter III
NORTH DAKOTA-CANADA TRADE AND THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
Security of Free Trade: History of U.S.-Canada Free Trade
The idea of a free trade association between the United
, -1States and Canada preceded Canada's formal confederation.
i
It continued in the first session of Canadian parliament 
ever held. The result was an negotiated economic treaty 
with the United States. As the United States continued its 
metamorphis from follower to hegemonic leader, it sought 
additional trade pacts with Canada.
The Reciprocity Treaty of 1854. Britain, the world's 
hegemonic trade leader during this point in history, opened 
up its markets to many new traders by freeing trade with all 
its trading partners.2 Prior to this agreement, England 
granted special trading treatment only to its colonies. 
Britain had worked to free up world trade for a variety of 
reasons: perhaps the most important motivation was to slow 
industrial development in Europe so that England could reap 
the benefits of the markets for its manufactured goods.3 In
■'■Canada's formal confederation was July 1, 1867.
2 . .David A. Lake and Jeffry A. Freiden, International
Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth(New York, St. Martins, 1987).
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order to provide stable markets for its goods, Canada and 
the United States, in a time of scarce external markets, 
sought to provide a stable market by forming a free trade 
area.
The reciprocity treaty provided for free trade in 
agricultural and forest products; ores and metals; dairy 
products; animal, fish, and kindred products; but very few 
manufactured goods. Although the list of products covered 
under the treaty seems short, this was so because at the 
onset of the treaty fifty-five percent of U.S. exports 
entered Canada duty free as did ninety percent of Canadian 
exports to the United States.4
The reciprocity treaty lasted scarcely ten years. The 
United States cancelled the treaty in 1866 after giving the 
required one year notice. A number of reasons were given 
for abrogating the agreement, among them were British 
preference for the confederacy during the Civil War5 and 
increased Canadian duties during the life of the agreement 
which violated the letter and spirit of the agreement.6 It
5Ibid. England believed that no other European 
countries had the technology to compete with itself if 
protective barriers were removed.
4Peter Morici. "U.S.-Canada Free Trade Discussions: 
What are the Issues?" 15 American Review of Canadian Studies: 311-323.
R . . .  . .Anna Guthrie, "A Brief History of Canadian-American 
Reciprocity," in Peter Morici, "U.S.-Canada Free Trade 
Discussions."
6J.L. Granatstein, "The Issue That Will Not Go Away: 
Free Trade Between Canada and the United States" Royal 
Economic Commission on the Economic Union and Developmental
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has also been suggested that the agreement failed because 
both Canada and the United States equated downswings in 
their respective economies during portions of the life of 
the agreement with the agreement's provisions. Conversely, 
after the failure of the reciprocity treaty, tariff 
protections had been rationalized as the cause of growth 
preceding the onset of the agreement.* 78
The reciprocity agreement and the current free trade 
agreement are similar in that the tariff situation between 
the countries was quite similar prior to the onset of the 
U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement. If history does repeat 
itself, the FTA will have a great test for survival in the 
near future. The complicated nature of the trading 
relationship, and the relatively volatile nature that the 
economy may take, leaves the current attempt at a free 
trading relationship on shakey ground at the onset of this 
agreement.
Canadian Confederation (1867) to 1911. During the late 
1800s, Canada sought to establish an agreement similar to 
the reciprocity agreement of 1854, but this attempt was to 
include more manufactured goods. The United States failed 
to adopt such an arrangement because the trade policy of the
Prospects for Canada, May 1984:8 in Peter Morici "U.S.- 
Canada Free Trade Discussions."
7Ibid.
8William Diebold, Jr. "The History and the Issues" in 
William Diebold, Jr. ed., Bilarteralism, Multilateralism and 
Canada in U.S. Trade Policy. Cambridge: Ballinger, 1988.
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United States during this period was learning toward 
protectionism for domestic industries.9
Protectionist sentiments declined in the United States 
during the late 1880s/early 1890s as the U.S. assumed its 
role as the hegemonic leader. But just as the Americans 
were ready to embark on another round of tariff reduction 
measures with Canada, Canada lost its willingness to enter 
into a treaty. Canada had embarked on a nationalism policy 
to protect the outflow of Canadian technology and know­
how.10 Attempts to reach an agreement failed largely 
because of the inability of the two parties to reach a 
consensus on the form of an arrangment; Canada wanted a free 
trade area while the United States wanted a customs union.11
The 1911 U.S.-Canada Agreement. In January of 1911, 
semtiment in both the United States and Canada was ripe for 
a third attempt at a reciprocity agreement. This agreement 
was much more broad sweeping than the Reciprocity Treaty of 
1854, however. More agricultural and natural resource 
products, as well as more manufactured goods, were included 
in the agreement.12 Although both governments of the day
QAnna Guthrie, "A Brief History of Canadian-American 
Reciprocity," in Peter Morici, "U.S.-Canada Free Trade Discussions."
10This policy, called the National Policy, was not a 
great economic success through the end of the century. 
Canadian nationalism was running high and the fear of the 
loss of Canadian sovereignty prevented an agreement.
11Anna Guthrie, "A Brief History of Canadian-American 
Reciprocity," in Peter Morici, "U.S.-Canada Free TradeDiscussions."
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were willing to enter into an economic union, the Canadian 
electorate wasn't quite so ready. The Liberal government of 
Wilfred Laurier was defeated by the Conservative party 
headed by Robert Borden. This spelled an end to free trade 
talks until after the two world wars. This era was 
characterized by heavy protectionist sentiment in Canada 
(significant tariff increases) and the United States 
(Smooth-Hawley tariffs of 1930).
Post World War II. Following World War II, Canada ran 
a significant balance of payments deficit with the United 
States and this situation brought about more protectionism 
in Canada in the late 1940s. Canadians were envious of the 
American gains made immediately following World War II. The 
Government of Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King was 
interested in becoming more closely tied to the United 
States economically, so that Canada could reap the benefits
• t .that the Americans were enjoying abroad.
The only bilateral trading agreement between the United 
States and Canada during this period (with the exception of 
the 1988 Free Trade Agreement) was the 1965 Automotive 
Agreement, more commonly referred to as the Auto Pact. This 
agreement was by no means a free trade agreement. Instead, 
the Auto Pact was an agreement to prevent a rash of Canadian 
tariffs from distorting trade in automobiles between the two 13
1^Peter Morici, "U.S.-Canada Free Trade Discussions."
13William Diebold, Jr. "The History and the Issues," 
in William Diebold, Jr., Bilateralism. Multiateralism and Canada in U.S. Trade Policy.
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countries. Although the Auto Pact eliminated tariffs on 
automobiles and automobile parts manufactured in the two 
countries, the agreement also contained safeguards to Canada 
requiring U.S. automakers to undertake levels of production 
in Canada related to the volume of sales there. This 
agreement illustrates the willingness of Canada to make 
concessions as well as its unwillingness to enter into full­
blown free trade. The Auto Pact set the tone for Canadian
tolerance of foreign investment on its soil.14
(
Free Trade Today. One theme arises out of the 
discussion of the past attempts at liberalized trade between 
the United States and Canada: the U.S., in its role as the 
hegemonic leader of the trading world, showed its desire to 
free trade with its most important trading partner. Canada 
has always been hesitant to enter a reciprocity agreement. 
For a second time in the trading history of the United 
States and Canada, a free trade agreement will be 
implemented, at least for the time being. The stability of 
the agreement will likely be a function of the political and 
economic stability in the two countries, if history is to 
repeat itself.
It appears likely that Canada may again assume its 
historical role as the nation that is scared of free trade. 
This hesitancy on the part of Canada is a major factor in 
making the agreement inherently unstable. The FTA will 
probably last at least the next four years until the next
14Peter Morici, "U.S.-Canada Free Trade Discussions."
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Canadian general election. But with a recession predicted 
to sink in within one to two years in Canada15, the Canadian 
electorate will look to rationalize a cause of this 
downswing in the economy as has been Canada's position since 
World War II. Historically, protectionism became greatest 
when the economy experienced a downswing. Most certainly 
the FTA will be looked upon and blamed as the culprit of the 
recession. For instance, just four days after the November
21st, 1988 Canadian general election, Gillete of Canada, a<
major toiletries manufacturer, announced that its Montreal 
(Quebec) plant would be closed down. Immediately the 
opposition parties in the Canadian Parliament blamed this 
plant closing on the FTA. What the Canadian media (and 
opposition parliamentarians) failed to report was the 
closure of the Minneapolis (Minnesota) Gillette plant that 
same day. Plant closures will continue to be blamed on the 
FTA, whether or not the FTA is actually to blame. The FTA 
will be blamed in both countries for plant closures and 
subsequent loss of jobs that accompany a recession. The 
irony is that the Government of Canada and the Canadian 
electorate have historically acted in opposite directions at 
the onset of a recession. When economic times get tough, 
the Canadian government has historically tried to improve 
access to the American market. Conversely, the Canadian 
electorate's position has been opposite to its government's
1R .The Economic Council of Canada in Canada has 
predicted little or no growth in the Canadian economy by the end of 1990.
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orientations. The American government has tended to 
practice protectionism in its trade policies in times of 
economic downswing.16
One further comment must be made; the effects of the 
agreement will likely be felt very far into the future 
because of the agreement's long implementation schedule.17 
Looking at the EEC for guidance, there is little doubt that 
a free trade area does take a great deal of time to develop. 
Change will take time, but its the rocky road of change that
i
the agreement will encounter. Changing the purchasing 
habits of consumers will be difficult. Economic decisions 
on the part of manufacturers will likely be based on 
perceived stability of the agreement. At least in the short 
run, Canadians will be swayed by the opposition parties in 
Canada that the FTA has done nothing positive for Canada, 
and the deal will likely be abolished in Canada before its 
implementation period is complete (with the required six 
months notice).
United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement; Provisions 
This section provides an examination of the provisions 
of the current free trade agreement. The purpose of this
16Earl H. Fry, "Trends in Canada-U.S. Free Trade 
Discussions: 1911-1986" in A.R. Riggs and Tom Velk, eds. 
Canadian-American Free Trade: Historical. Political and 
Economic Dimensions Halifax: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1987).
17Allan M. Maslove and Stanley L. Winer, Knocking on 
the Back Door: Canadian Perspectives on the Political 
Economy of Freer Trade with the United States (Halifax: The Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1987).
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examination is to set an adequate background to assess the 
impact of the FTA on North Dakota's energy sector, thus 
setting the background for chapter four. Provisions of the 
agreement that do not apply to North Dakota's energy sector, 
or are likely to have no effect on trade in energy, are 
included to a very limited degree in Appendix B.
On January 2, 1988, United States' President, Ronald 
Reagan, and Canada's Prime Minister, Brian Mulroney, 
separately signed what has been descibed as the largest and 
most important trade agreement ever undertaken by two 
countries, covering more trade and trade-related issues than 
any previous agreement. ° The U.S.-Canada Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) proposes to break new ground to establish a 
trading arrangement that is unique between two independent 
countries. This agreement allows for freer trade, not 
totally free trade; not all goods or services that the two 
countries produce are included in the provisions of this 
agreement. Of the areas covered in the FTA, tariff and non­
tariff barriers are eliminated subject to a four-tiered 
tariff elimination schedule.
The FTA is an agreement on trade and trade-related 
issues negotiated so as to be consistent with the terms and 
limitations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). The FTA builds on the general framework of the 
GATT. Although the FTA is an attempt to place importance on *
T ftExternal Affairs Canada, The Canada-U.S. Free Trade 
Agreement [Ottawa, Ont.]: External Affairs Canada, 1987.
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American-Canadian bilateral trade, it is not an attempt to 
isolate the United States and Canada from the rest of the 
trading world. As such, the United States and Canada have 
restated a mutual commitment to maintain fair trade 
practices throughout the world. Through a free trade 
agreement, the United States and Canada have also expressed 
a desire to preserve and strengthen the largest trading 
relationship between two countries.20 The FTA sets a new 
standard for trade agreements concluded under the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).21 The two countries 
have accepted each other as preferred trading partners in a 
more sweeping agreement than what was established in the 
European Economic Community.22 23
The FTA includes provisions that, in the view of the 
two participating nations, augment the GATT. For instance, 
the GATT has been particularly weak in its language dealing
. . . . . . p "5with subsidies, dumping and countervailing measures. J The
1 Q •. The GATT provides for free trade areas and customs 
unions that would remain consistent with the GATT so long as 
other members of the GATT are treated equally outside of the 
chosen method of trade liberalization.
p n  ,. The United States and Canada traded goods and 
services valued at $152,980,000,000 U.S. in 1986.
21External Affairs Canada, The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: Synopsis [Ottawa, Ont.]: External Affairs Canada, 
1987.
p p The other trading partners of the United States and 
Canada will continue to receive the same treatment under 
GATT as was the case before the FTA.
23External Affairs Canada, The Canada-US Free Trade 
Agreement. A countervailing measure is a tariff application 
by country "A" on a commodity of country "B" that has been
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FTA is designed to be flexible to deal with unique 
situations that may arise in which the agreement itself may 
not have directly addressed. In order to deal with trade 
disputes between the parties to the agreement, and to avoid 
much of the bickering that occurs when GATT members try to 
settle a dispute, a bi-national judicial body will be 
formed to deal with disputes arising under the FTA.
The FTA provides for the liberalization of trade in 
most areas of the United States' and Canada's economies,
i
which in the long run will effect a more formal integration 
of the two countries' economies.24 Because these countries 
are presently very much integrated, there probably won't be 
a radical adjustment necessary by either party to implement 
the agreement. The provisions of the FTA pertaining to 
energy are summarized below.
Energy. The FTA prohibits import and export 
restrictions on energy goods, including minimum export 
prices. Any export quotas used to enforce short supply or 
conservation measures must ensure that the second party
"dumped" on country "A's" market at less than the cost of 
production. Country "A" has taken steps to protect its own 
producers because the subsidies have made the commodity of 
country "B" look more efficiently produced, and have priced 
country "A's" producers out of the market as a result.
24Ronald Wannacot and Paul Wannacot, Free Trade Between 
the United States and Canada: The Potential Economic Effects 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967). Wannacot and 
Wannacot argue that there will be a harmonization of economies with a broadsweeping free trade arrangement. The 
American and Canadian economies are already largely 
integrated as a result of the trade patterns preceding the 
FTA. However, with the financial provisions of the 
agreement (including investment) the two economies will 
likely see greater economic integration.
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receives a proportionate share of energy goods received 
before the shortage occurred.
The FTA establishes the following specific rules as to 
the trade of energy between the two countries:
1. Recognition of the other country's respective rights under the GATT, including no inconsistency with the 
Agreement on an International Energy Program (IEP).
2. Each country must interpret the GATT to prohibit 
minimum price requirements; those requirements are 
permitted only in the enforcement of countervailing 
and antidumping orders and undertakings.
3. A tax may be levied on export energy provided 
that an equal tax be levied and maintained on 
domestic energy.
4. In the event of an energy shortage, the exporting 
territory must continue to provide energy to the 
other territory proportionate to the amount supplied 
before the shortage.
5. Both parties agree to allow existing or future incentives (subsidies) for oil and gas exploration 
in order to maintain reserve bases. Subsidies may 
not actually extend to the actual production of oil 
and gas, however.
6. Investment opportunities will become available for 
each country in the other country's territory 
without discrimination.25
The FTA also provides for the continued allowance of 
government monopolies such as provincially owned electricity 
companies in Canada, or in the case of the U.S. federally 
controlled Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). It is expected 
that long-term arrangements will be negotiated to ensure the 
development of electricity trade in a mutually beneficial 
manner consistent with the objectives and principles of the
25A11 of these provisions are included in Article 9 of 
the FTA.
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FTA. The absence of such arrangements makes it more 
difficult to determine the exporting behavior of the each 
party's energy producers. Absent such an arrangement, the 
writer has to assume that this type of arrangement will not 
be included in any future amendment, due to the lack of 
indication as to the possible content of such an 
arrangement.
Border Measures. Currently, most trade between the 
United States and Canada is free. Eighty percent of 
Canadian exports flow into the U.S. duty free, while sixty- 
five percent of U.S. exports flow into Canada duty free.
The average Canadian duty on U.S. dutiable exports is 
between nine and ten percent, while the average U.S. duty 
on Canadian dutiable exports averages four to five 
percent.26 7 The key to any true free trade agreement is the 
elimination of virtually all tariffs on trade between the 
parties to such an agreement. American and Canadian tariffs 
on the goods of third world countries will remain unchanged 
and under each country's control regardless of the 
provisions of the current agreement. In the elimination of 
many of the existing tariffs between the U.S. and Canada, 
the FTA provides for a four-tier tariff schedule:
26External Affairs Canada, Canada-U.S. Free Trade 
Agreement.
o 7 .Arlene Wilson, Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement 
(Washington: Congressional Research Service, January 1988): CRS-7.
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1. industries ready to compete now will see an elimination 
of all tariff and non-tariff barriers on January 1,
1989 (Schedule A).
2. a five year equal stage reduction in tariff and non­
tariff barriers would occur beginning on January 1, 
1989, and ending in 1994 (Schedule B).
3. a ten year equal stage reduction in tariff and non­tariff barriers would occur beginning on January 1, 
1989, and ending in 1998 (Schedule C).
4. a continuation of the current situation in which there 
are no tariffs or non-tariff barriers placed on goods 
in this category (Schedule D).
North Dakota's unprocessed energy and electricity fall into
the fourth category because there are currently no tariffs
levied on energy as defined by this study.
In addition to tariff reduction, customs user fees
currently employed by the United States will be eliminated
subject to Article 403 of the FTA.28 Duty drawbacks and
duty remissions and waivers must also be eliminated subject
to a reduction schedule ending on January 1, 1994. These
measures help to ensure that rule of origin provisions
discussed in the following section aren't manipulated to the
detriment of one of the parties.
28Customs user fees are special fees charged to the 
importer of goods (a handling charge by customs) that are 
free of duty, thus constituting a barrier to trade.
^Duty drawbacks, waivers, and remissions are techniques used to avoid duties on articles when articles 
are imported into one of the countries for manufacturing and 
the finished product is exported to another country. Duties 
are actually paid upon import, but are subsequently refunded 
on export.
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The FTA also deals with situations in which shortages 
of supply occur:
[E]xport restrictions for such purposes (shortage of 
supply) may not reduce the proportion of the good 
exported to the other country relative to the total 
supply of the good compared to the proportion exported 
prior to the imposition of the restriction. 0
The rationale for this protection is that given the
integration and specialization expected from this
initiative, the parties not only share in the benefits that
accrue from this agreement; each country must also share in
(
the shortfalls of supply and production. This provision of 
the agreement is particularly relevant to the trade in 
energy. One country cannot cut off supply to the other in 
times of shortage; energy must be shared in the same 
proportion to the foreign consumer enjoyed before the 
shortage. The average for the preceding thirty-six month 
period is the determinant of the proportion to be shared.
Rules of Origin. Only goods produced in Canada, the 
United States, or in both Canada and the United States 
qualify for the tariff reductions in this agreement. 
Explicit in the FTA is the prohibition of other countries 
receiving the benefits of this agreement. This is to 
prevent multi-national corporations from gaining access to 
the free trade zone by importing goods through an American 
or Canadian sudsidiary and selling said goods as goods 
manufactured in the free trade area. Both countries will
30External Affairs Canada, Canada- U.S. Free Trade
Agreement: Article 409.
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continue to apply their existing tariffs to imports from 
other countries.
This section of the FTA describes content law on goods 
partially manufactured in the U.S. or Canada, whether using 
raw materials from other countries or partially manufactured 
in either country. Manufactured goods sold in either the 
U.S. or Canada would have to incorporate a significant 
portion of the manufacturing in one or both of the
countries. The agreement implies that in most cases, fifty
( .
percent of value added must occur in either or both 
countries, although the proportion of minimum value added in 
the free trade area varies by product.
Trade in energy is mostly unaffected by this provision. 
Energy imported into the United States and Canada from both 
inside and outside the borders of the agreement generally 
arrives in an unprocessed form with the exception of 
electricity. Even with electricity there is little danger 
of foreign processing intruding on the American or Canadian 
markets disguised as American or Canadian electricity 
because of the geographic limitations of the free trade 
area.
Quotas. Most export and import quotas are disallowed 
unless specifically allowed by the GATT or grandfathered by
the FTA. Allowable quotas apply to the auto industry and




of the parties may maintain or introduce quotas for other 
products given certain production situations. J Quotas are 
explicitly disallowed for the regulation of trade in energy. 
As previously mentioned, shortage of supply does not 
constitute an acceptable situation for an export quota on 
energy and energy products.
National Treatment. The FTA reaffirms the GATT 
principle preventing discrimination against imported goods. 
Goods from the other party may be treated only in the same 
manner of treatment afforded to its domestic goods of the 
same nature. This protection prevents replacement of 
external measures (tariffs) with internal measures 
(nontariff barriers) favoring domestic products once goods 
of one party are in the other's market.3 4 * This section is 
particularly important in the trade of energy. It ensures 
that trade in energy will not be subject to discriminatory 
practices disguised as local public policy decisions in the 
interest of local producers.
Technical Barriers. The use of technical standards as 
trade barriers has been strictly prohibited by the FTA. In 
the past, the United States and Canada have used these
33For example, subsidies paid to U.S. wheat producers 
are much higher than those paid to Canadian farmers. Canada 
may establish quotas until sudsidy levels become equal.
34External Affairs Canada, Canada-U.S. Free Trade 
Agreement.
An important exception to this rule is state and 
local government procurement policies. This issue is 
discussed later in this chapter.
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barriers on non-dutiable goods as an unnecessary obstable to 
trade, thus constituting a nontariff barrier.36 In order to 
ensure that this type of nontariff barrier is eliminated, 
the FTA provides for a harmonization of technical standards. 
In order to facilitate this harmonization the two countries 
will implement national treatment of testing labs and 
certification bodies. The agreement provides for certain 
exemptions from product standards:
1. measures of protection through technical standards 
falling under the juristiction of a state or province.
2. measures or procedures that can be demonstrated to 
achieve a legitimate domestic objective (an objective 
whose purpose is to protect health, safety, essential security, the environment, or consumer interests.
3. measures or procedures that do not operate to exclude 
goods of the other party that meet that legitimate 
domestic objective. 7
The harmonization of technical standards in the 
generation of electicity has become a particularly 
contentious issue. In the United States, juristiction over 
the sulfur dioxide emissions of thermal-electricity 
generating plants falls within the domain of the federal 
government. As such, Washington maintains a national 
standard of sulfur dioxide emissions regardless of the total 
emmission load introduced in an individual geographical
36An example of this practice was the U.S.'s ban of 
Canadian pork because Canadian producers used a certain 
anti-biotic banned in the U.S., although prior to the 
controversy the U.S. officials were well aware that Canadian 
hog producers used the banned substance.
37External Affairs Canada, Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement: Articles 601, 603 and 609.
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area. North Dakota falls under the same per-plant emmission 
standards as large industrial states such as Michigan.
There is no flexibility in these standards to take into 
account that North Dakota as a whole emits much less S02 
that an industrial state, relative to what the air can hold 
in that particular area.
In contrast to the nation-wide restrictions placed on 
American sulfur dioxide emissions, the Canadian government 
delegates control over emissions to its provinces. Thus 
arises the question of achieving harmonized emmission 
standards in electricity production as standards falling 
under the juristiction of a state or province are exempt 
from the harmonization of technical standards provided in 
the agreement. The American regulation which requires 
installation of an air scrubber on coal fired plants to 
reduce S02 emmissions, creates a burden not necessarily 
shared by the Canadian coal fired producers. This 
pollution-control device requirement intuitively places 
North Dakota producers at a cost disadvantage, all other 
factors being equal. If Canadian provinces continue to have 
juristiction over this form of pollution control, the issue 
falls outside of the juristiction of the agreement. North 
Dakota producers thus will always find themselves at a 
potential cost disadvantage in coal-fired electricity 
generation. The impact of this provision is somewhat
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diminished due to the nature of electricity production in
• • . O OManitoba, North Dakota's main energy competitor.
Emergency Action. Temporary import restrictions to 
protect domestic industries harmed by imports from the other 
country may be allowed, but only in certain circumstances. 
The FTA will allow such emergency actions only in special 
cases, and only during the tariff reduction period. No such 
emergency action will be allowed after January 1, 1998.
In granting special restrictions, the United States and 
Canada have attempted to smooth out the adjustment to a free 
trade zone. Some industries may be ready to compete only 
after a certain adjustment period; the tariff reduction 
schedule may in fact be too short for adjustment in those 
areas. If one of the parties chooses to envoke emergency 
action, it is understood that the other country will be 
allowed a special reciprocal exemption, to even out the 
effects of discrimination and to prevent abuses of the 
emergency action provisions during the tariff reduction 
period:
The provisions of this chapter are important in 
establishing a more predictable climate for investors in 
both countries to take advantage of the agreement, 
secure in the knowledge that their access to the other 
market will not be impaired by capricious action 
stemming from domestic complaints.38 9
38Almost all of Manitoba's electricity generation is 
hydro-driven, which is not an issue of technical standards 
vis-a-vis sulfur dioxide emissions. Although Manitoba does 
have a coal-fired plant near Winnipeg, its purpose is not to
constantly generate electricity, rather it is to provide 
generating capacity when water levels are low in Manitoba.
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Unprocessed energy and electricity is set to compete now; 
there is no indication that this section could be used to 
the advantage of American or Canadian energy industries.
Government Procurement. Each year the governments of 
the United States and Canada purchase billions of dollars in 
goods and services.40 Before the FTA, it was standard 
practice for each government to discriminate against the 
goods of other countries, choosing instead to patronize 
domestic producers and service providers. Before the FTA,
t . .
only federal contracts exceeding $171,000 could be bid on by 
foreign parties, and only in certain government departments. 
The FTA allows providers of goods or services to bid for 
federal government contracts in the free trade area in most 
government departments where the contract amount exceeds 
$25,000.
The United States will gain access to twenty-two 
Canadian government departments (excluding the departments 
of Transport, Communication, and Fisheries and Oceans), as 
well as ten agencies. Canada will gain access to most U.S. 
government departments (excluding the Departments of Energy 
and Transport), forty government agencies, NASA and the 
General Services Commission. The range of departments 
covered in the agreement is likely to expand as the two 
parties continue negotiation in this area. These
J^External Affairs Canada. Canada-U.S. Free Trade 
Agreement.
40External Affairs Canada, Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement.
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negotiations must be concluded no later than one year after 
the conclusion of the current round of the GATT 
negotiations.
As far as the procurement policies of the North Dakota 
state government, there is no mandated change in disallowing 
discriminatory procurement policies at the state level. If 
the University of North Dakota (as a state institution) 
chooses to buy North Dakota coal even where costs may exceed 
foreign coal, the state regulation would be allowed to 
stand. Only federal procurement policies will be under the 
scrutiny of this deal.
It should be clear from the shear size difference in 
government spending between the United States and Canada 
that Canadian manufactures and service providers have the 
greater potential to gain. But in fact, given that there is 
a great number of American subsidiaries operating in Canada, 
the size of this gain will likely be smaller. There is 
likely to be an exodus of certain Canadian subsidiaries of 
American companies back to the United States if the 
agreement takes hold.41
Investment. The FTA provides for equal treatment of 
the establishment of new businesses only. American and 
Canadian investors must be treated in an equal manner as 
domestic investors. The exceptions to this are:
41John Whalley, Canada-U.S. Free Trade (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1986).
88
1) regulation that doesn't serve as a barrier to trade (e.g. 
laws governing competition); 2) Canadian regulation in the 
oil, gas, and uranium sectors; and 3) Canada's right to 
review direct acquisition of firms in Canada by U.S. 
investors which will be retained with some restrictions. 
Presently, the Canadian government has the right to review 
all American acquisitions of Canadian business. By 1992 
only one-quarter of all total non-financial assets would be 
reviewable (the company would have to worth more than $150 
million at that time).
One of the parties may decide that nationalization of a 
certain industry is in the public interest. If such 
nationalization was to take place, the interests being 
expropriated would be entitled to due process of law, and 
would be entitled to a fair market value.42 For example, 
Canada under the government of Pierre Trudeau nationalized 
the petroleum industry in the 1970s. The present Canadian 
government could choose to follow the same action, but such 
a decision would upset the spirit of the agreement, and 
would probably be seen as a direct blow to the attempt at 
trade liberalization.
General Dispute Settlement. The FTA provides for 
methods and timetables for dispute settlement with the 
desire that the parties arrive at a mutually satisfactory 
solution. A United States-Canada Trade Commission is
42External Affairs Canada, Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement: Section 1605.
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created for the resolution of conflicts that arise. The 
Commission will consist of a panel of two Americans, two 
Canadians, and one other person agreeable to the two 
parties. If the commission fails to provide a satisfactory 
settlement, binding arbitration must be undertaken to settle 
the dispute.43
Anti-dumping and countervailing duty cases are dealt 
with in a different way than the above dispute mechanism. 
Each party retains the right to apply its anti-dumping and 
countervailing duty laws to goods imported from the 
territory of the other party. A bi-national panel will be 
chosen to adjudicate disputes regarding each others' anti­
dumping laws. In addition, the two parties will engage in 
negotiations governing subsidies and dumping in order to 
develop mutually advantageous rules governing such 
matters.44
Amendment and Termination. The agreement may be 
amended by bilateral action of the parties. As mentioned 
earlier, there is an attempt to define what constitutes 
subsidies. A major pitfall with the agreement is the
43Each country will have continued access to its own 
body to determine whether its countervailing duties were justified. If the other party disputes the findings as an 
incorrect application of the provisions of the FTA, it may 
appeal to a panel. The panel is formed with each country 
choosing two members and a fifth member chosen jointly.Each country may seek a review of an anti-dumping or 
countervailing duty determination by that panel. This panel 
will have binding powers on both parties.
44External Affairs Canada, Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement.
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failure of the two countries to agree upon the question of 
subsidies, and what constitutes a subsidy. There are to be 
negotiations in the next five to seven years to determine 
what a sudsidy is. Both energy and especially agriculture 
utilize sudsidies. The lack of definition at this time 
makes the task of predicting the impact of the agreement on 
each industry that much more difficult, given this great 
unknown variable.
North Dakota energy producers, and other economic 
sectors in North Dakota for that matter, will continue to 
wonder whether the publically controlled electricity 
corporations in Manitoba are receiving operating subsidies. 
The determination of what constitutes a subsidy in this 
situation will be very difficult. Although there is a 
dispute settlement mechanism in the FTA, there has to be 
some type of standard for the tribunal to apply to energy 
subsidy questions. Simply interpreting the intentions of 
the writers of this document versus an agreement on what 
constitutes a subsidy, subjects the parties to a more 
arbitrary tribunal determination.
A major limiting force of this present agreement is its 
termination clause; either of the parties may terminate this 
agreement under six months notice to the other party. The 
threat of terminating the agreement with such a short 
notification period will have the effect of distorting 
economic decisions, contradicting the agreement's goal to 
prevent economic distortions. Firms that trade in capital
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intensive goods, which energy certainly fits this 
description, will be reluctant in tying up capital with the 
threat of cancellation of the agreement.45 Hesitancy on the 
part of investors would certainly impair some of the 
predicted positive results of the agreement.
The FTA by no means is a perfect agreement; the two 
countries already acknowledge this. In no way can the 
negotiators of the two countries fully know the impacts of 
the provisions. ■ As in the case with any negotiated pact 
there had to be give and take; some sectors of the American 
economy will lose, some will win. The United States hopes 
that there will be a general gain in aggregate welfare from 
the implementation of the agreement. Whether North Dakota 
energy producers will win or a lose is the topic of chapter 
four, but the potential stability of the agreement is an 
important factor in its effect on the economies of both 
countries. The next section examines the North Dakota- 
Canada trading relationship to determine patterns of trade 
and accompanying rationality.
North Dakota-Canada Trade
Historically, North Dakota has not been a major 
exporter to Canada by any means. Only 1.5% of North 
Dakota's gross state product (GSP) is exported to Canada 
which is well below the U.S. national average of 4.4%. On 
the other hand Canada exports slightly more than twice as
A R , , , ,A further discussion of sunk costs is included in chapter four.
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much to North Dakota as it imports. This North Dakota- 
Canada trading relationship mirrors the relative 
unimportance of the Canadian market to American producers, 
and conversely the importance of the American market to 
Canadian producers.46 To illustrate the importance of this 
point, a comparison of exports to gross national product 
(GNP) is in order. Table 2.1 makes this comparison. The 
total trade between the United States and Canada in 1986 
exceeded $150 billion (U.S.).
Table 3.1 United States and Canada Trade and Gross National 







% of GNP 
exported to 
each other
U.S. 3,947 356.560 171.815 4.4
Canada 346 100.794 81.425 23.5
Source: Canada's Trade Statistics. 2nd ed. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, December 1987.
A major reason for North Dakota's lack of trade with 
Canada is the production of similar products on both sides 
of the border, e.g. agricultural products. North Dakotan 
and Canadian producers compete for external markets in many
------A ' f c.' " 'Canada has a small domestic market; in order to 
achieve economies of scale it must agressively pursue 
international trade. North Dakota, on the other hand, has a 
much greater domestic market and directs its efforts to 
supplying that market given its factor endowments and 
economic limitations, versus agressively seeking trade with Canada.
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areas. For example, as North Dakota's economy has grown 
over its one hundred year history it has competed directly 
with Canadian agricultural producers. Trade between the U.S. 
and Canada in any great proportion usually occurred only 
where an agricultural product was produced by only one of 
these parties.47 *
Where production is similar, competition for foreign 
markets has been the focus of trade efforts. To market its 
supply of wheat,’ the United States and Canada have competed 
against each other (and most recently the EEC, Australia and 
Brazil) for control of the lucrative Soviet market.
Although in the North Dakota-Canada trading relationship 
there certainly is duplication, (e.g. electricity and 
processed petroleum products), for the most part, North 
Dakota-Canada trade has augmented North Dakota's economic 
activity. Trade in most products has come about to fill a 
void on either side of the border. This has caused some
• • • • A  Ospecialization in North Dakota's economy.
Although there are not extremely detailed statistics on 
trade between North Dakota and Canada by product, Statistics
47For instance corn is produced in North Dakota, the 
provinces in proximity to North Dakota engage in very limited corn production. In 1986 North Dakota exported $5.3 
million (Canadian $) or $4.08 million (U.S.) worth of corn 
to Canada.
HOScot A. Stradley, A Staple Perspective on Economic Development in North Dakota (University of North Dakota: 
Bureau of Business and Economic Research, May 1981). As 
Stradley has argued, North Dakota's economy has been, and 
continues to be driven by, its factor endowments: its 
fertile land and its resource base.
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Canada and the United States Department of Commerce 
publishes estimates of the leading exports and imports in 
the North Dakota-Canada trading relationship.49 Where more 
precise detail on trade by product cannot be ascertained by 
Statistics Canada, it has created the category "other 
trade." The category "other trade" encompasses about one- 
third of trade between North Dakota and Canada. This lack 
of more descriptive data does place limitations on the 
making of generalizations for this study. Nevertheless, 
observations on the nature of North Dakota-Canada trade will 
be made given these limitations.
What the statistics do tell us is that North Dakota is 
an importer of electricity and processed petroleum products 
demonstrating that there is some trade in energy. As there 
is some trade in energy, we must examine the nature of this 
trade and its adherence to the principle of economic 
efficiency as well as North Dakota's production behavior 
based on factor endowments and comparative advantage.
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 profile North Dakota-Canada trade by 
major commodity group.
49For example see The North Dakota-Canada Trading 
Relationship (Washington: United States Department of 
Commerce, International Trade Administration, February 19, 
1988) and various Canadian trade statistics reports including Canada-U.S. Trade by State of Destination (Ottawa: 
Statistics Canada, December 1988).
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Soil Preparation, Fertilizing, 
and Seeding Equipment
9,300,000
Other Ag machinery 9,300,000





a. Because these trade statisitcs are quoted in Canadian 
dollars, all other comparisons of statistics quoted in 
American dollars will be given a Canadian dollar equivalency 
in parenthesis using an exchange rate of $1 U.S. = $ 1.31 
Canadian and $1 Canadian = $0.7635 American (an approximate 
exchange rate for 1986).
k. Although the category "other trade" accounts for a 
significant proportion of the trade figures, the shear 
number of categories comprising this figure made a more 
precise description of North Dakota-Canada trade less 
manageable for Statistics Canada.
Source: Canada-U.S. Trade bv State 
Statistics Canada, December 1988).
of Destination. (Ottawa:
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Table 3.3 North Dakota Imports From Canada, 1986
(in Canadian Dollars)3





Motor Vehicle Parts 52,200,000
Newsprint 10,500,000
Soil Preparation and 
Seeding Equipment 10,500,000
Other Equipment 20,400,000
Other Equipment and Tools 11,000,000
Other Trade*3 103.600.000
Total $431,700,000
a. Because these trade statisitcs are quoted in Canadian 
dollars, all other comparisons of statistics quoted in 
American dollars will be given a Canadian dollar equivalency 
in parenthesis using an exchange rate of $1 U.S. = $ 1.31 
Canadian and $1 Canadian = $0.7635 American (an approximate 
exchange rate for 1986).
b. Although the category "other trade" accounts for a 
significant proportion of the trade figures, the shear 
number of categories comprising this figure made a more 
precise description of North Dakota-Canada trade less 
manageable for Statistics Canada.
Source: Canada-U.S. Trade by State of Destination. (Ottawa:
Statistics Canada, December 1988).
With the current limitations and provisions of the FTA 
in mind, the fourth chapter provides an examination of the
effects of the FTA on North Dakota’s energy sector for the 
remainder of this century.
CHAPTER IV
NORTH DAKOTA ENERGY AND THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
With few exceptions1, energy has become an item very 
much taken for granted since the industrial revolution.f
Energy has become so much a part of our daily lives that few 
people wonder whether adequate and affordable supplies will 
continue to be available. Well developed industrial 
economies, such as the American and Canadian economies, rely 
heavily on large amounts of energy to process goods into 
products headed for both domestic and international markets. 
One of the spin-off effects of this industrialization has 
been the creation of employment for a country's populus. 
Prior to the oil shortages of the 1970's caused by the Arab 
oil embargos, not much debate has been given to establishing 
a stable supply of energy at a reasonable price, an 
essential priority of American economic trade policy. The 
embargos, however, have at least alerted the policymakers of 
the United States for the need to secure energy supplies for 
America's future. The energy provisions of the FTA were 
negotiated so as to work toward this goal.
1For example the Arab oil embargos of the 1970s.
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The United States and Canada, on average, currently 
trade over ten billion dollars per year in energy and energy 
products each year.* 3 This energy trading relationship has 
been mostly stable with the exception of the implementation 
of Canada's National Energy Program of the late 1970s.4 For 
the most part North Dakota's small energy trading 
relationship with Canada has been stable and harmonious 
until recently. Recent pressures have mounted to put that 
relationship on less stable ground.5 6 In 1986, North 
Dakota's two way trade with Canada was $456.5 million, of 
this trade, we can say for sure that $72.3 million was in 
the trade of energy and energy products.
As the United States takes steps to ensure a stable 
supple of energy, it has sought to augment its domestic
^U.S. Department of Commerce. The U.S.-Canada Free 
Trade Agreement [Washington, D.C.j: U.S. Department of 
Commerce, December 1987.
3Arlene Wilson, Canada-U.S Free Trade Agreement 
(Washington: Congressional Research Service, Economics 
Division, February 8, 1988).
4The National Energy Program was implemented as a means 
of limiting foreign ownership of Canadian energy production. 
The program's philosophy was that Canada would be more 
secure if its energy resources were controlled internally.
5For instance during Governor Allen Olsen's tenure, it 
was revealed that the University of North Dakota was 
purchasing Canadian coal for its steam plant. The North 
Dakota Legislature then enacted legislation to effect a government procurement policy. North Dakota products are to 
receive preferential treatment by institutions of the 
government of North Dakota.
6U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade 
Administration, Office of Canada, The North Dakota-Canada 
Trading Relationship [Washington, D.C.]: U.S. Department of 
Commerce, International Trade Administration, Office of 
Canada, 19 February 1988.
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production. For North Dakota, energy is not just an average 
industry, it's a determinant of the state's economic 
viability. The question that has to be addressed from the 
point of view of North Dakota's energy producers is how will 
the potential for injection of foreign energy into the 
United States impact on North Dakota's energy sector?
Bearing the preceding question in mind, this chapter will 
examine the impacts that the FTA will have on North Dakota's 
energy sector. In order to assess the impact the current 
trading situation is examined where data is available and 
appropriate, and projections are made as to what the future 
holds for North Dakota energy producers and consumers under 
the FTA. The sub-sectors to be examined are petroleum, 
natural gas, coal, and electricity. The raw, unprocessed 
energy resources are examined because these are key to the 
energy sector in the state; the processing of raw energy 
resources is minor in the state with the exception of 
electricity generation. All of the energy subsectors 
examined will continue to receive protection from tariffs 
imposed by the other party while under the terms of the FTA. 
Because of the difficulty in quantifying some of the data 
and the unavailability of other data, a full cost-benefit 
analysis is not attempted here. An examination of the pro's 
and con's of the FTA is instead undertaken.
General Assumptions used in the Analysis
It is assumed that Manitoba and Saskatchewan are to be
North Dakota's only direct electricity competitors. This
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assumption is made with the rationale that North Dakota's 
trading area with Canada in electricity would continue to be 
with these two Canadian provinces, as is the current trading 
situation. The building of transmission lines to receive 
foreign electricity over distances further than these two 
provinces would create a regional barrier to staying 
competitive with Manitoba and Saskatchewan electricity.7
North Dakota's only competition for the lignitic coal 
it mines and utilizes in the generation of electricity (89.4 
percent of North Dakota domestic generation is by coal-fired 
steam) is Saskatchewan, one of only two Canadian provinces 
that mines lignitic coal. The other province that mines 
lignitic coal is New Brunswick. New Brunswick lignite is 
not considered to be competitive with Saskatchewan and North 
Dakota because of the distances to market as well as the 
difference in mining techniques employed. New Brunswick 
mines much of its coal underground which proves to be more 
costly than North Dakota and Saskatchewan's surface mining 
techniques.
Potential regional petroleum competition is found in 
Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba as each engages in crude 
oil extraction. However, for the purposes of this study, 
Manitoba is not included as a competitor with North Dakota 
because of the very minute amount that is extracted in 
Manitoba each year. Manitoba currently exports no oil to
'Ron Kirby, Vice President for Development, Manitoba 
Hydro, interview by author, Winnipeg, Manitoba, 27 April1988 .
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the United States; all of the oil extracted is transported
• • • • ftto Ontario where it is refined and consumed.
Alberta and Saskatchewan are assumed to be North 
Dakota's main competitors for its gas markets. Although 
Saskatchewan currently trades no natural gas with North 
Dakota, it has the potential to trade in natural gas. 
Alberta, the largest natural gas producing province in 
Canada, currently exports a large amount to the United 
States. Manitoba is not included in the natural gas 
analysis as it produces no natural gas.
Because there is no available information about the 
possible impacts the FTA will have on North Dakota energy, 
and the writer is by no means an expert on North Dakota 
energy and energy policy, the basic approach to discovering 
the impacts of the FTA is to examine the current 
relationship in the trade of energy between North Dakota and 
Canada, and use the opinions of energy industry leaders 
about the expected impacts of the FTA.8 9 Therefore, the
8Energy, Mines and Resources Canada, The Crude 
Petroleum and Natural Gas Industry 1986 [Ottawa, Ont.]: 
Energy, Mines and Resources Canada, 1987.
9The following industry leaders' opinions were utilized 
for the analysis: Bob Graveline, Associate Director of the 
North Dakota Industrial Commission, Oil and Gas Division; A. 
Bryan Ransom, President of Manitoba Hydro, and Ron Kirby, 
Vice President for Development, Manitoba Hydro; Bob 
Reinstein, Trade Specialist in energy of the U.S. 
International Trade Administration; and Joe Mercier, 
president of Universal Explorations Ltd., a major natural 
gas exporter to the United States. Numerous other energy 
industry officials were contacted, but did not have an 
opinion on the free trade agreement for various reasons, 
e.g. they hadn't had the time to read the agreement and 
conduct a policy analysis on its provisions.
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writer has made the assumption that these opinions were made 
honestly, to the best of the industry leaders' knowledge on 
how the markets in each respective sub-sector of energy 
operate.
The final assumtion made for the analysis is that the 
energy technologies currently used in the state will remain 
as they are today. No newly developed technology, or 
technology not currently in use in the state will be 
considered. In the area of electricity, which has the most 
potential for a change in technology (e.g. nuclear power 
plants), change in electricity generation technology is 
unlikely given the unattractiveness of other technologies 
versus the relatively cheap lignitic coal that is plentiful 
and easily accessible in North Dakota.
Subsidies. In order to make a free trade agreement a 
truly fair trade agreement, there has to be a mechanism to 
deal with subsidies. The FTA has not instituted a mechanism 
to deal with subsidies in the production of energy. Speaking 
on the Canadian Television Network's public affairs program 
Question Period, then U.S. Trade Ambassador Clayton Yeutter 
said that a program to deal with subsidy questions will be 
negotiated so that American and Canadian producers will be 
on a "level playing field."10
In projecting the impact of each sub-sector of North 
Dakota energy, subsidies, both direct and indirect, will not
10Clayton Yuetter, U.S. Trade Representative, Office of 
the United States Trade Representative, televison interview, 
CTV's Question Period. 1 May 1988.
\
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be factored into the cost of production. There will be no 
examination of the subsequent effect subsidies have on the 
export price, if subsidies do in fact exist, although this 
has the potential to be very important to each countries' 
ability to compete in the energy market. Although 
negotiations are to be held to deal with the subsidy 
question, the results of the negotiations, if any, cannot be 
speculated upon, and therefore cannot be taken into account. 
Oil and Gas Industry
i
An examination of the current trading relationship 
between North Dakota and Canada is made difficult by the 
lack of trade statistics broken down by state and province; 
statistics are available for regions only. Therefore, there 
is a need to make estimates as to how much oil and gas is 
traded between North Dakota and Canada.
There was no crude oil entering North Dakota from 
Canada to be refined in North Dakota in 1987 and Canada has 
not been a historical petroleum supplier to North Dakota.
All of the oil and gas refined in North Dakota was extracted 
from North Dakota.1 2 The Canadian oil situation mirrors the 
North Dakota situation, in that Canada does not import North 
Dakota oil. The nature of American and Canadian oil 
production is that production is comsumed inside the borders 
of what is now the free trade area. Because Canadian and
11Bob Graveline, Associate Director, North Dakota 
Industrial Commission, Oil and Gas Division, interview by 
author, 12 April 1988.
12Ibid.
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American oil production does not fully supply the needs of 
its internal market, there appears to be little chance for 
trade behavior to change as a result of the agreement. Thus 
it appears that the same assumptions made for the North 
Dakota oil industry also hold for the Canadian oil industry. 
There are some refined oil products coming into North Dakota 
from Canada but these will not be considered as refined 
products goes beyond the scope of this analysis.
North Dakota oil producers extracted 45,600,000 barrels 
of crude oil and 62.2 billion cubic feet of natural gas in 
1987. In 1987, 27,000,000 barrels of the total production 
were sent out of state and 18,600,000 barrels of oil were 
refined and consumed in the state. North Dakota natural gas 
consumption was 19,234,050,000 cubic feet in 1987. None of 
North Dakota's excess natural gas extraction was exported to 
Canada. In extracting the above-mentioned amount of oil and 
gas, the industry employed 5211 people at an average salary 
of $27,192.83 per year.13 More recent figures were not yet 
available for inclusion in this analysis.
The key to determining the effect of the FTA on the 
North Dakota Oil and Gas industry is the price of these 
commodities and how prices are determined. Oil as a 
commodity is traded on the commodities market in a manner 
that is close to the free market in North Dakota's case. 
Since 1984, the petroleum cartel, the Oil Producing and
U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Wages Annual 
1985 [Washington, D.C.]: U.S. Department of Labor, October 
1987.
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Exporting Countries (OPEC), has been unable to agree on the 
optimum number of barrels to supply to importers that would 
benefit each producing nation while simultaneously keeping 
the world price of oil as high as possible. In the North 
American market there is no difference in the way that the 
Canadians market their oil, and there are no special 
subsidies that exist to the producers of either country, 
with the exception of exploration subsidies.
Oil prices have fluctuated greatly over the past ten 
years, but neither the United States or Canada can have even 
a minute effect on the world price. The price will continue 
to fluctuate as the OPEC producers agree or continue to 
disagree on the amount of production. North Dakota has 
relied on foreign refined oil products and will continue to 
benefit from foreign oil with the FTA. The United States 
will continue to benefit from the security of Canadian oil 
supplies versus other foreign oil supplies with the 
protection of the FTA. It is hoped that the U.S. will 
become secure in supply with Canadian reserves open to 
American Companies and ultimately to American consumers.
The United States will also not be subject to the policy of 
the Canadian government in the late 1970s-early 1980s of a 
National Energy Policy which served to limit the percentage 
of foreign oil companies that could operate in Canada.
A continued supply of incoming foreign oil will allow 
North Dakota to sacrifice potential short term production 
jobs for future energy security. The current North Dakota-
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Canada trade in refined oil products is designed so that 
North Dakota will depend on some foreign oil (in this case 
in a refined state) to protect some of its oil reserves, in 
order to retain energy security in the future.14 The 
benefit to North Dakota in relying on some foreign oil is 
not unifaceted, however. It also allows for a more 
efficient use of capital in the state vis-a-vis the refining 
of crude petroleum. The price of building additional 
refining facilities outweighs the benefits in refining more 
oil in the state.15 North Dakota production, whether 
consciously or unconsciously, is following the economic 
reasoning of the theory of increasing costs as discussed in 
chapter two. To determine the value of this plan for North 
Dakota's energy security, crude oil reserves have to be 
examined.
North Dakota currently has crude oil reserves of 
approximately 262,000,000 barrels.16 At the current level 
of production, assuming that there is no further crude oil
14This also allows North Dakota to forgo production 
when the price of North Dakota crude is too low to warrant extraction.
15Bob Graveline, Associate Director, North Dakota 
Industrial Commission, Oil and Gas Division, interview by 
author.
16U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information 
Administration, U.S. Crude Oil. Natural Gas, and Natural Gas 
Liquid Reserves 1984 Annual [Washington, D.C.]: U.S. 
Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, 25 
September 1985. An examination of the 1984 production year 
yielded an increase in reserves of 2,000,000 barrels after 
1984's production had been taken into account. The 
relationship between newly discovered reserves and 
production allows the reserve base to stay quite stable.
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potential in the state, North Dakota oil reserves would be 
depleted in five and one-quarter years.17 Currently the 
newly discovered reserves have kept pace with crude oil 
extraction to keep reserves stable. But there will come a 
time in the future when North Dakota will have no further 
reserves. The state will then become totally dependent on 
out of state supply.
Therefore, it is in the state's best interest to 
partially rely on foreign oil, or as is the current 
situation foreign refined petroleum products, for a portion 
of its petroleum comsumption. This would allow North 
Dakota's crude oil industry to stablilize the extraction 
industry, offering a more stable employment situation in the 
industries future, and as a benefit to the state tax coffers 
offer a stable tax supply as well. The FTA would allow 
North Dakota to deplete the resources of another state or 
country and saving some of its reserves for the future. The 
North Dakota Council on Oil and Gas and the United States 
Energy Information Administration was unable to supply an 
estimate as to potential recoverable petroleum resources. 
This makes it nearly impossible to determine optimum crude 
oil extraction. Thus such an attempt to calculate this 
benefit has not been made in this paper.
Natural Gas. The price of natural gas closely follows 
crude petroleum production because the production of natural
17220,000,000 (reserves) divided by 45,600,000 (1987 
production) = 5.74 years.
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gas is most often associated with the extraction of 
petroleum. During the last four years the natural gas 
industry in both the United States and Canada has 
experienced de-regulation, the result has been a more 
competitive pricing system for natural gas in both 
countries. But the Canadian producers of natural gas have 
little hope that the FTA will mean expanded markets for its 
natural gas, and by implication, North Dakota consumers will 
not likely receive any benefits from added competition.
The supply of marketable natural gas in Canada did, 
however, increase from 65.1 billion cubic meters in 1983 to 
71.9 bilion cubic meters in 1986. During that time span, 
the value of export natural gas fell from $195 per thousand 
cubic meters to $122 per thousand cubic meters (Canadian 
dollars). But despite this drop in price North Dakota's 
competition is limited. Manitoba produces no natural gas 
and therefore isn't a threat to North Dakota's markets. 
Saskatchewan produced 1,814 million cubic meters, accounting 
for 2.5 percent of Canada's production. Although the price 
of Canadian natural gas has fallen dramatically as a result 
of the de-regulation of the Canadian natural gas industry, 
it appears doubtful that the FTA will have any short-term 
implications for the North Dakota natural gas industry.
To illustrate the lack of change in natural gas 
marketing as a result of the FTA, we have to assess whether
1 ftxoWet Natural Gas is gas produced from an oil producingwell.
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the FTA will affect the marketing patterns of natural gas
producers from the pre-agreement status quo. Joe Mercier,
President of Calgary's Universal Explorations Ltd., which
exports five million cubic feet per day of natural gas to
the United States has doubts that the FTA will at all affect
the marketing of natural gas in the United States or Canada:
I don't think that this (the Free Trade Agreement) is 
going to make a damn bit of difference. The Americans 
buy gas when they want it. If its a cold winter they 
will buy, if its warm they will buy less. It's as 
simple as that. It's a big game and free trade has no 
effect. 9
North Dakota's gas reserves total 664 billion cubic 
feet of dry marketable natural gas. At the current rate of 
production, the state's reserves will last for 10.67 years
• • o n  •if no more reserves are discovered. North Dakota will 
eventually run out of natural gas, but, as is the case with 
crude petroleum, the unexpected discovery of new reserves 
makes the estimation of the depletion of North Dakota's gas 
reserves difficult.
If North Dakota is willing to take advantage of the 
FTA, as it pertains to the purchase of natural gas from 
Canada, it stands to gain in the following ways:
1. The FTA provides security to the users of gas. 
Without the FTA, and its current energy provisions, the 
state would deplete oil and gas reserves more quickly. The 1920
19Financial Times of Canada (October 12, 1987).
20664,000,000 (reserves) divided by 45,600,000 (1987 production) = 10.67 years.
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result will be higher prices to the North Dakota consumer in 
the long run.
2. Employment in the oil and gas industries will be 
spread over a longer period of time than would be the case 
if North Dakota had to supply all of the crude petroleum and 
petroleum products its consumers currently demand.
3. Revenue from the oil extraction tax and the oil and 
gas gross production tax will remain stable over the long- 
run for the state.
The costs of the FTA relative to North Dakota Oil and 
Gas indsutries would be:
1. Reliance on foreign oil and gas which could put 
North Dakota in a vulnerable position were the current 
trading situation in which no tariffs are levied on crude 
oil and gas production was to change. The state might not 
be in the position to immediately supply itself with the 
necessary oil aand gas. However, during the time frame of 
the projections, there would be no threat of running out of 
oil without the agreement. The ease of resuming production 
of oil and gas does lessen this drawback, however. Refined 
petroleum products is the real area of concern for short 
term effects of the maintenance of the status quo because 
Canada could certainly apply large tariffs to refined 
petroleum products if the FTA were to break down.
2. When North Dakota oil and gas reserves are depleted, 
assuming that no other technology exists for the uses 
currently served by the oil and gas industry, the state's
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users will be subject to the foreign supplier's conditions 
and the threat of increased costs if supply was held back. 
This danger is lessened by the fact that Canada is and has 
been a relatively stable supplier in the past, but OPEC has 
certainly not been as predictable in its exporting behavior.
The precise costs and benefits in dollar terms cannot 
be determined because of the limitations of the data. 
Although there is little evidence that there will be a 
change in oil and gas extraction behavior as a result of the 
FTA, North Dakota would be wise to pursue an optimum 
extract-import situation. Because of the lack of knowledge 
of the actual reserves of both oil and gas, the optimum 
extract-import situation is not calculated. This could be 
the topic of more extensive study. But the results remain 
relatively clear —  North Dakota should not gamble with its 
non-renewable oil and gas resources. Once these resources 
are depleted, North Dakota will be bound by the rules of its 
supplier, absent a trade arrangement such as the FTA; North 
Dakota's tax base will also suffer a considerable loss.
Coal and Electricity Industries
The coal and electricity industries are to be jointly 
examined due to the dependence of the North Dakota coal 
industry on the intra-state generation of electricity. 
Statistics on electricity traded between North Dakota and 
Canada are more complete in comparison to oil and gas 
statistics, and this lends itself to a more detailed 
examination than the previous section. Table 4.1 presents a
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breakdown of fuels used for the generation of electricity in 
North Dakota for 1986.
Table 4.1 Electricity Generation
by Energy Source
in North Dakota 
(1986)
Energy Source
Percent of Total 
Power Generated3 Power Generated
Coal Fired 19,835 89.4






fired, gas fired, petrleum combustion,
Source: Bill Robinson, North Dakota Intergovernmental Assistance, 1988
Department of
The following assumptions are made in the analysis of 
North Dakota's electricity and coal industries. Consumption 
of electricity in North Dakota will rise two percent per 
year (the projected national average to the year 2000). 
Manitoba and Saskatchewan's domestic electricity consumption 
will also increase by two percent per year (estimates of 
Manitoba Hydro and Saskatchewan Power Corporation). Coal 
consumption will remain constant to aid in the calculation 
of the number of years that North Dakota coal reserves will 
last. It is assumed that Manitoba and Saskatchewan will 
realize proposed additions to generating capacity as
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reported in the 1986 Annual Report on Canadian 
electricity.21
Of the 25.7 million short tons22 of coal extracted and 
used in North Dakota during 1986, 17,354,000 of the total 
coal consumed was utilized for the generation of 
electricity. No lignitic coal was imported from Canada.
North Dakota's electricity industry generated 
22,182,000 megawatt hours during 1986. During that same 
period North Dakotas consumed 6,398,651 megawatt hours. The 
excess of the power, 15,781,349 megawatt hours were sold or 
exchanged with out of state buyers. Also included in the 
excess electric power generated is the losses that occur in 
the transmission of power to its customers, either in state 
or out of state.
The FTA will provide Canada and the United States 
continued access to each other's coal and electricity 
markets as explained in the introduction of this chapter.
As such, intuitively it would seem reasonable that the 
cheapest of the price of the imported electricity, 
domestically available electricity, or the cost of a company 
to generate its own electricity, should be the determining 
factor in an electric power company's decision to buy or 
generate the electricity bound for its market. It would 
also seem logical that one party would generate an
2iEnergy, Mines and Resources Canada, Electric Power in 
Canada 1986 [Ottawa, Ont.]: Energy, Mines and Resources 
Canada, 1987.
22The standard unit of measure for coal in the United 
States is the short ton which equals 2000 pounds.
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additional amount of electricity to sell to another party if 
there was money to be made with reasonble risks. There are, 
however, complicating factors to this. These complicating 
factors follow the examination of the current trading 
relationship between North Dakota and Canada in electricity.
In 1986, North Dakota imported 1,381,010 megawatt hours 
of electricity from Canada (value approximately $15,000,000 
U.S.). Manitoba is the larger of North Dakota's Canadian 
suppliers having sold 1,271,127 megawatt hours to North 
Dakota in 1986, accounting for ninety-two percent of 
electricity imported into North Dakota. During that same 
period, Saskatchewan, North Dakota's only other foreign 
electricity supplier, sold 109,883 megawatt hours for in­
state consumption, or eight percent of North Dakota's 
imported electricity.
In order to determine whether trade in electricity 
between North Dakota and Canada will be affected by the FTA, 
there is a need to examine whether Manitoba or Saskatchewan 
will change their exporting behavior, i.e will the 
generating capacities of Manitoba or Saskatchewan change as 
a result of the FTA?
In 1986, Manitoba had an installed generating capacity 
of 4142 megawatts (99.3 percent hydro generated and 0.3 
percent coal fired).23 4 If all of Manitoba's generating




stations were to operate at full capacity for one hour, a 
total of 4142 megawatt hours would be generated. Because of 
the fluctuations in water supply and load requirements, it 
is estimated that Manitoba had the capacity to generate 
23,000,000 megawatt hours in an average year.25 Presented 
below is table 4.2 demonstrating the potential amounts of 
surplus electricity that Manitoba will have available for 
export if added generating capacity begins as planned in 
1986. This table does not reflect a possible revision with 
the signing of the free trade agreement. Table 4.3, 
presented below, demonstrates Saskatchewan's planned 
additions to generating capacity to the year 2000, 
irregardless of the FTA. As was the case with Manitoba 
Hydro, the assumption is made that with an increase in 
generating capacity, the same proportion of electricity will 
be made available to service North Dakota demand for 
electricity. Saskatchewan's generating capacity in 1986 was 
2659 megawatts.26 It is estimated by the Saskatchewan Power 
Corporation that the province will generate 11,900,000 
megawatt hours at that capacity. To determine the yearly 
electricity generation for the analysis period, additional 
capacity is calculated at the same ratio of generating 
capacity to yearly generation (1:0.0002234).
25Ron Kirby, Vice President for Development, Manitoba 
Hydro, interview by author.
26Energy, Mines and Resources Canada, Electric Power in 
Canada 1986.
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Table 4.2 Manitoba Electricity Generating Capacity









1986 0 23,000,000 13,900,000 9,100,000
1987 0 23,000,000 14,178,000 8,822,000
1988 0 23,000,000 14,461,560 8,538,440
1989 0 - 23,000,000 14,750,791 8,249,209
1990 256 24,419,767 15,045,807 9,373,960
1991 640 27,973,348 15,346,723 12,626,625
1992 348 30,105,497 15,653,658 14,451,839
1993 0 30,105,497 15,966,731 14,138,766
1994 0 30,105,497 16,286,065 13,919,432
1995 0 30,105,497 16,611,787 13,493,710
1996 0 30,105,497 16,944,022 13,161,475
1997 130 30,827,318 17,282,903 13,544,415
1998 520 33,714,603 17,628,561 16,086,042
1999 650 37,323,709 17,981,131 19,342,578
Source: Electric Power Statistics 1986 (Ottawa: Energy, 
Mines, and Resources Canada, 1987).
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1986 0 11,900,000 10,100,000 1,800,000
1987 0 11,900,000 10,302,000 1,598,000
1988 100 12,347,537 10,508,040 1,839,497
1989 100 12,795,073 10,718,201 2,076,872
1990 0 12,795,073 10,932,565 1,862,508
1991 280 14,048,176 11,151,216 2,896,960
1992 0 14,048,176 11,374,240 2,673,936
1993 0 14,048,176 11,601,725 2,336,451
1994 85 14,428,582 11,833,760 2,594,822
1995 280 15,681,685 12,070,453 3,611,250
1996 0 15,681,685 12,311,844 3,369,841
1997 0 15,681,685 12,558,081 3,123,604
1998 0 15.681,685 12,809,242 2,872,443
1999 0 15,681,685 13,065,427 2,616,258
SourceMines
: Electric Power Statistics 
and Resources Canada, 1987)
1986 (Ottawa: Energy,
As table 4.2 indicates, Manitoba would stand to gain a 
greater share of the North Dakota electricity market if its 
generating capacity increases by the amounts indicated, on 
average 23.8 percent over the twelve year period compared 
with a 19.9 percent share held in 1986. This observation is 
made with the assumption that Manitoba Hydro could supply
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over and above its commitments to its domestic consumers. 
Saskatchewan as a supplier of electricity is not and will 
not be a major force in generating power for export to the 
North Dakota market. Table 4.3 demonstrates Saskatchewan's 
ability to supply excess power to potential out-of-province 
customers.
When one combines Manitoba's and Saskatchewan's excess 
electricity, and assumes that each province will continue to 
provide North Dakota with electricity equal in proportion of 
electricity sold to North Dakota compared with that 
province's excess for sale, it appears that Canadian 
electricity will gain a greater share of the North Dakota 
electricity market. The average share that Canadian 
electricity producers would hold over the twelve year period 
to the year 2000 would be 25.925 percent.27 The following 
tables (4.4 and 4.5) illustrate the share of the North 
Dakota electricity market if Manitoba and Saskatchewan were 
to sell the same proportion of electricity to North Dakota 
as a proportion of its total generating capacity based on 
the 1986 generating year.
P 7 • •For Saskatchewan the average market share is derived 
from the average projected share of North Dakota's 
electricity market from table 4.5. For Manitoba the average 
market share is derived from the average of projected share 
of North Dakota electricity market for the period in table 4.4.
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Table 4.4 North Dakota Projected Electricity Consumption 
and Projected Manitoba Share of the Import 
Electricity Market





1986 6,398,651 1,271,127 13.4
1987 6,142,827 1,226,258 20.0
1988 6,565,019 1,186,843 18.1
1989 6,735,709 1,146,640 17.0
1990 6,910,837 1,302,980 18.9
1991 7,090,519 1,755,100 24.8
1992 7,274,873 2,008,805 27.6
1993 7,464,019 1,965,288 26.3
1994 7,658,084 1,934,801 25.3
1995 7,857,159 1,875,625 23.9
1996 8,062,482 1,829,445 22.7
1997 8,271,080 1,882,673 22.8
1998 8,486,128 2,235,959 26.3
1999 8,706,767 2,688,618 30.9
aThis assumes a 2% increase in North Dakota electricity
consumption each year from 1987 to 1999.
bBased on the proportion of excess generating capacity of 
the province in relation to the amount exported in the 1986 
generating year.
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Table 4.5 North Dakota Projected Electricity Consumption 







Projected Share of ND Market
1986 6,398,651 109,800 1.7
1987 6,142,827 97,478 1.5
1988 6,565,019 112,209 1.7
1989 6,735,709 126,689 1.9
1990 6,910,857 113,613 1.6
1991 7,090,519 176,714 2.5
1992 7,274,873 163,110 2.2
1993 7,464,019 149,233 2.0
1994 7,658,084 158,284 2.1
1995 7,857,159 220,286 2.8
1996 8,061,482 205,560 2.5
1997 8,271,080 190,540 2.3
1998 8,486,128 175,219 2.1
1999 8,706,767 159,592 H* • 00
aThis assumes a 2% increase in North Dakota electricity 
consumption each year from 1987 to 1999.
i_DBased on the proportion of excess generating capacity of 
the province in relation to the amount exported in the 1986 
generating year.
The increase that Canadian electricity producers could 
realize in the share of the North Dakota market without 
increasing generating capacity beyond what is already
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planned, is presented as a worst case scenario. If 
individual power companies want to buy power from Canada, 
they may do so now. North Dakota shouldn't expect an 
increase over the amount per year that is currently being 
sold, though. Most of the electricity sales to North Dakota 
is in the form of interruptable electricity, purchased when 
an electric company may be short of power for its customers 
during a peak period, or after the breakdown of its own 
generating plant or its supplier's plant.
Even with the FTA, Manitoba's decision to increase its 
generating capacity will not be altered. The projected 
increases in generating capacity are made with the intention 
of ensuring that Manitoba's domestic market's needs are 
adequately taken care of. Any excess is available for sale. 
Mr. Ron Kirby, Vice President for development for Manitoba 
Hydro said that the FTA will not in any way affect Manitoba 
Hydro's decision to increase its generating capacity above 
and beyond its current plans with the chance of obtaining a 
greater market share in North Dakota, or in any state for 
that matter.28
Increasing generating capacity to serve a potential 
market that could disappear in six months (the notice one 
party must give to the other for the termination of the 
agreement), would simply be too risky. Manitoba Hydro's 
reaction to increase its generating capacity to fulfill this
n o , , ,Ron Kirby, Vice President for Development, Manitoba
Hydro, interview by author.
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potential market would involve billions of dollars in 
investment of new hydro-electric generating stations. 
Manitoba is not prepared to take such a risk. To further 
illustrate this point we may look to Manitoba's planned 
addition to its generating capacity in 1997-1999. 
Construction of the Katanakus hydro electric generating 
station (at a cost of $5 billion Canadian) is contingent on 
guaranteed long-term power sales to the province of Ontario.
The sale is currently being negotiated with Ontario for the
(
sale of 1000 megawatts of noninterruptable power. This sale 
to Ontario further weakens Manitoba's ability to supply 
excess power to North Dakota and thus Manitoba's ability to 
supply North Dakota's import market would be diminished. 
According to the President of Manitoba Hydro, A. Brian 
Ransom, construction of the generating station will not be 
undertaken unless Ontario signs an agreement guaranteeing
O  Qthe purchase of power.
Compounding the unwillingness of Manitoba Hydro to take 
such a risk is the fact that many of North Dakota's power 
companies are bound by the costs associated with previous 
generating decisions, and in the short run, would not choose 
to buy power for resale to its customers unless that power 
is purchased to supplement a peak demand. For example, a 
company that has chosen to build its own generating station, 
which many companies have chosen to do, is bound to 9*
9 Q , .A . Bryan Ransom, President of Manitoba Hydro.
Interview on the Canadian Broadcasting Association's news
program 24 Hours. 15 November 1989.
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contracts for energy input, whatever the fuel of choice may 
be. Capital investment in generating plants must also be 
taken into consideration as a factor distorting the decision 
to generate or buy electricity from another supplier. 
Replacing generating plants that are neither outdated, or in 
many cases, have bonds that are still outstanding, would be 
placing a great amount of capital in a position to lie idle. 
Thus the sunk costs argument of Markusen comes into 
effect.30 Abandoning plants in these situations becomes 
extremely inefficient, economically speaking.
A related topic must be considered: the efficiency of 
purchasing electricity. Ninety-eight percent of Manitoba's 
electricity exports to North Dakota and 89.4 percent of 
Saskatchewan's electricity exports to North Dakota is 
interruptable, that is, power is not continuously supplied. 
Acquiring interruptable power supply enables North Dakota's 
power companies to handle peak load seasons much more cost- 
effectively. A North Dakota power company will not be 
forced into building generating capacity exceeding its 
average demand load when that generating capacity would be 
grossly under-utilized during the remainder of the year. 
Obtaining interruptable electricity from Canada thus lowers 
North Dakota's power companies' capital costs associated 
with running plants far below capacity. This certainly must
30For a further discussion of sunk costs see chapter 
two; see also James R. Markusen "Canadian Gains from Trade 
in the Presence of Scale Economies and Imperfect 
Competition," in John Whalley, Canada-U.S. Free Trade 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985).
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be viewed as a benefit associated with the maintenance of 
free trade in energy. Although the exact saving to the 
consumer is difficult to calculate for the state as a whole, 
it has been estimated that North States Power Company (NSP) 
customers have saved $42.5 million per year ($24 
million/year in fuel cost savings and the remaining saving
in plant construction deferral) as a result of having access
. . . . . 31to Canadian electricity imports for this very reason. A
second benefit of such a situation is that capital will not
be crowded out of the market place. Thus capital should be
more readily available and the costs of capital should be
cheaper, economically speaking.
Saskatchewan Power Corporation started the period with 
1.7 percent of the North Dakota domestic power market. In 
1999, Saskatchewan Power Corporation could potentially 
supply 1.8 percent of North Dakota's market. The average 
share of the North Dakota electricity market that 
Saskatchewan may have across the twelve year period between 
now and the year 2000 is 2.05 percent, which is slightly 
more than what is currently held by the Saskatchewan Power 
Corporation.
There is little question that the FTA on its face 
appears to present a favorable situation to Canadian power 
producers, presenting them with the continued opportunity to 31
31Anthony Benkusky, Vice President for Transmission and 
Inter-Utility Services. Testimony to the Congressional 
Subcommittee on Trade, Ways and Means Committee, March 11, 
1988, Fargo North Dakota.
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sell excess electricity. But the risk involved, e.g. sunk 
costs and unpredictable tariff behavior, will prevent the 
Canadian power producer from flooding the market with 
cheaper energy. Rules contained in the FTA pertaining to 
the dumping of energy (and other products) below the costs 
of production will provide further protection to North 
Dakota producers.
It is expected that the present trading relationship in 
lignitic coal will continue. Saskatchewan exported only 
$9,333 (Canadian dollars) worth of coal to the region 
consisting of Minnesota, North Dakota and South Dakota in 
1986. Whichever state(s) received this lignite certainly 
didn't receive a quantity to be considered substantial. It 
is expected that this lack of trading between North Dakota 
and Canada in lignitic coal will continue. Even with the 
government procurement section of the FTA, there is no 
restriction for the government of North Dakota or private 
business to continue its practice preferential purchasing of 
coal. This section applies to the federal governments of 
the respective countries only (on purchases over $100,000). 
It is likely then that the trade in coal will not be 
affected by an agreement that maintains the pre-agreement 
status quo.
Efficient Generate-Purchase Decisionmaking. North 
Dakota has an energy supplier in this state that does 
operate with the assumption that efficiency is best achieved 
with a combination of ninety percent of its energy generated
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from within the company and ten percent of the energy 
purchased from the outside suppliers. In deriving this 
ninety-ten breakdown, Northern States Power Company (NSP) 
has taken into account the risks involved with purchasing 
power and has taken steps to guarantee supply from, in this 
case, foreign suppliers.
Northern States Power is also able to react to problems 
in supply for electricity generating fuels by diversifying
its choice of fuels. In 1988 fifty percent of the
(
electricity generated by NSP came from coal, thirty-five 
percent came from nuclear power, ten percent came from 
Canadian hydro electric power, and five percent from 
domestic hydro electric power. This diversification of 
supply and the relatively small reliance on imported power 
has not only brought about a stable supply of energy to its 
customers, but has also saved the NSP customer twenty-four 
million dollars per year in just lower fuel costs.32
In addition to the fuel savings provided by NSP 
purchasing a portion of its electricity, savings have 
accrued to NSP's customers in the deferral of plant 
construction and the saving of major capital expenditures. 
Energy purchases from Canada displace higher cost 
generation. This has saved NSP customers $250 million in 
the period between 1980 and 1987.33 Anthony Bunkusky, Vice 




savings are utilized: some of the savings are passed on 
directly to the customer in the form or lower energy costs; 
the remainder allows NSP to explore and develop new coal- 
fired technologies. These new technologies will enable NSP 
to build high-tech coal-fired plants that cost considerably 
less than current practices and are environmentally 
friendlier.34 Northern States Power Company has 
successfully blended a diverse set of generation resources 
into an efficient production system.
Northern States Power Company has explicity stated it 
is not looking to forego domestic power sources; NSP uses 
8.5% of all coal shipped in the west-north-central region or 
one percent of all coal shipped in the U.S. The benefits 
that accrue to NSP and its customers have resulted from a 
diverse mix of resources, providing production cost 
stability, supply reliability, and the encouragement of 
competition among alternative energy sources needed to 
produce lower costs.
If North Dakota doesn't have access to Canadian 
electricity, more coal will be required to handle the void 
created. North Dakota's coal reserves will be depleted in 
365 years, which is certainly a long time, especially with 
prospects for new energy technology in the years to come.35 
If the current market share that Canadian electricity
34Ibid.
359,790,965,000 (coal reserve) divided by 26,787,810 (coal to generate electricity) = 365 years (assuming constant consumption).
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producers currently enjoy, North Dakota coal will deplete in 
380.97 years.36 If Canadian electricity producers were to 
gain a 25.925 percent share of the North Dakota electricity 
domestic market, North Dakota’s coal reserves would deplete 
in 384 years.37 This doesn't amount to a great monetary 
benefit given the time period in which the benefit would be 
received but nonetheless it must be considered.
For North Dakota's electricity consumers, there would 
be numerous benefits and few costs associated with the 
provisions of the FTA (maintaining the free trade status 
quo). First there would remain a somewhat competitive 
market for electricity in North Dakota which would keep 
prices down. Canadian producers would also subsidize North 
Dakota's consumers if the Canadian producers are indeed 
subsidized.
Second, if Manitoba is to remain the dominant foreign 
producer of electricity to North Dakota, a reduction in the 
amount of pollution in the state will result. Manitoba's 
energy is chiefly water generated, which does not contribute 
to the air pollution caused by coal-fired plants. A 
reduction in the amount of pollution should then result, by 
the amount that Manitoba Hydro supplies in addition to its 
present market share.
369.790.965.000 (coal reserve) divided by 25,700,000 (coal to generate electricity) = 380.97 years (assuming 
constant consumption).
379.790.965.000 (coal reserve) divided by 25,479,104 
(coal to generate electricity) = 384 years (assuming constant consumption).
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Third, in the event of supply shortages in Manitoba or 
Saskatchewan, either supplier would be mandated to share 
supply. Thus North Dakota consumers would be guaranteed the 
same proportion of power generated before the shortage, thus 
the North Dakota consumer assumes less risk in importing 
Canadian electricity as the Canadian producer takes in 
exporting this power (given capital costs of generating 
stations.
Fourth, North Dakota would benefit from maintaining a 
diversity of supply of fuels used to generate electricity. 
Thus current reserves of coal would last longer, causing 
more steady employment for the residents of the regions 
which rely so heavily on energy for local economic activity.
The costs of the FTA relative to the coal and 
electricity generating industries are fairly minor. This is 
the case because of the pre-FTA situation not the FTA 
itself. The rules of the game are not set to change 
dramatically with the FTA. Thus the state will be able to 
operate with the same amount of energy security as it did 
before the agreement was entered into. There is a cost in 
maintaining the status quo, however. This is the potential 
security cost of allowing foreign energy to permeate into 
the North Dakota market. This cost is, however, offset by 
the cost-effectiveness of importing energy to supplement a 
lower generating capacity and the benefits associated with 
this strategy.
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The bottom line in limiting the effects of the 
agreement in the willingness of Canadian producers to supply 
electricity to North Dakota consumers is the risk involved. 
Adding to generation capacity would be very risky to 
Canadian suppliers given that the FTA can be terminated with 
six months notice of one of the parties, leaving the 
electricity industry with underutilized capital and bonded 
indebtedness. This would ultimately lead to the price of 
electricity rising for consumers to carry the burden of the 
debt. The FTA thus provides no security to foreign 
producers that each other's markets will continue to be made 
available (beyond the six month period of notice to 
terminate the agreement). This translates into a very 
cautious and conservative increase in imported power to 
North Dakota, if any. But such an increase would have 
occurred regardless of the FTA.
The FTA would allow the present exchange of electricity 
between North Dakota and its Canadian suppliers to continue, 
providing no unforeseen hardships to North Dakota's 
consumers of electric power. In the event of electricity 
shortages in either country, the buyers are protected by the 
reduction in supply rule, which prohibits the supplier from 
reducing the proportion that the customer would have 
received if there hadn't been a reduction. Most of the 
trade in electricity is undertaken by a written contract 
which would address such a scenario for reduction in supply.
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The diversity of supply that exists in the North Dakota 
domestic electricity market is beneficial to the state. 
Although coal resources would last for more than 370 years, 
this is a finite amount. The citizens of the state are 
essentially determining the fate of future generations by 
using up non-renewable resources at a rate much faster than 
may be necessary. The FTA allows North Dakota to continue 
to slow that depletion, as well as having access to cheaper 
electricity which is subsidized by another country. In 
creating diverse sources of electricity supply, North Dakota 
consumers would recieve cheaper average rates, and would not 
forego the electricity supply within the state. This 
diversity is important in maintaining a stable source of 
electricity for North Dakota consumers.
North Dakota consumers thus receive the best of both 
worlds from the FTA relative to electricity. Excess 
Canadian electricity, which is cheaper in price than North 
Dakota's internally generated electricity, will be made 
available if North Dakota wants to buy it. The six month 
notice requirement for termination does ensure that North 
Dakota's market will be inundated with Canadian energy.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The development of North Dakota's economy has been 
characterized by much the same factors as David Ricardo 
described: most notably, production decisions based on a 
region's comparative advantage. In an analysis of the 
development of the North Dakota economy based on Watkin's 
staple hypothesis, Stradley discusses the state's economic 
development, yet he never directly addresses North Dakota's 
economic development based on comparative advantage. But 
as a result of the dominance of, and the reliance on, its 
two staple sectors, the North Dakota economy has taken on a 
unique character in the North American production area. The 
state has been willing to concentrate its production on its 
staples and trade for other goods it does not choose to 
produce (for many reasons).
But North Dakota has not only historically relied on 
its staple industries as the backbone for its private 
economic activity, the state has also built its public 
economic system around its staple economy. As the state's
1Scot A. Stradley, A Staple Perspective on Economic 
Development in North Dakota (University of North Dakota: 
Bureau of Business and Economic Research, May 1981).
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private economy is characterized by the boom and bust cycles 
of a resource-based economy, the public economy shares the 
same distinction. In examining the basis for its taxation 
system, it is quite apparent that the rationale for the 
North Dakota system parallels the mercantilist's philosophy; 
i.e., gain in the short term by reaping huge profits (tax 
revenues) without regard for the long term consequences of 
such a taxation philosophy (huge shortfalls during resource 
bust cycles). The underlying flaws in North Dakota's tax 
system would be even further accentuated if the United 
States-Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA) causes the North 
Dakota economy to experience decline. Thus this independent 
study has examined the impacts of the FTA on North Dakota's 
energy industry, not only because of energy's great impacts 
on the producing regions, but also because of an underlying 
reason, the stability of the institutions of government in 
the state.
Using the quantitative economic literature as an aid to 
predict the impacts of the FTA on North Dakota's energy 
sectors has not been very helpful. Very few studies even 
mentioned energy, and where energy was mentioned, processed 
energy was addressed which is not within the scope of this 
study. Even where energy is specifically mentioned there is 
no indication as to the areas that will be impacted and 
which states will be the winners or losers in this process. 
This has made the task of determining the impacts of the FTA 
on North Dakota energy that much more difficult.
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Most of the quantitative literature has dealt with the 
general welfare gains to each economy by utilizing 
relatively simple economic models, without regard for the 
realities of the complexity of the American and Canadian 
economies. Wannacot and Wannacot, along with other 
economists identified benefits for manufacturing and other 
industries based on scale economy considerations using these
9 . . . •models. But without seriously considering the non economic 
effects of a free trade area, namely consumer preference, 
elasticity of demand, or even the politics of consumption, 
the analyses are weakened in the ability of regional policy 
analysts to utilize the results to generalize impacts of the 
FTA on the North Dakota economy.
When one looks back to chapter four of this study, one 
theme becomes clear: the FTA itself will not substantively 
change the way energy is traded between North Dakota and 
Canada. Absent the FTA, trade in energy would likely 
continue in much the same manner that occurred before the 
FTA. North Dakota will not lose in the general sense, as it 
should continue at current production rates. A major 
benefit accruing to North Dakota is the continuance of a 
degree of supply diversity which is cost-effective for state 
consumers of energy. The long run benefit to the North 
Dakota consumer will be lower prices because diversity of 
supply will create a longer-term, and more stable producer
2̂Ronald Wannacot and Paul Wannacot, Free Trade Between 
the United States and Canada: The Potential Economic Effects 
(Cambridge, Massachusets: Harvard University Press, 1967).
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in North Dakota. If fact, the energy producing industries 
in North Dakota will produce longer under the FTA (the same 
guarantee of no tariffs on the trade in energy which was the 
trading situation immediately preceding the agreement) than 
if North Dakota were to rely exclusively on its own energy 
resources. The FTA thus serves to guarantee the status quo. 
Continuation of the FTA serves only to perpetuate the pre- 
FTA trading situation by six months, relative to pre­
agreement foreign producer market guarantees. Thus the 
risks involved in future investment tend to nullify the 
rational economic benefits of a free trade area.
The FTA provides no real security to Canadian energy 
suppliers to invest in capital intensive production to 
supply a free market economy that cannot be guaranteed 
beyond the six month termination period. As was separately 
argued by Markusen and Trembley, the risks to capital 
intensive producers (in North Dakota's and its competitor's 
case, energy production) in changing production behavior to 
serve potential international markets appears to be too 
high. The FTA may be dissolved with only six months notice 
from either party. As such, Canadian energy suppliers are
3 . . .See James R. Markusen, "Canadian Gains From Trade in
the Presence of Scale Economies and Imperfect Competition,"
in Canada-United States Free Trade, ed. John Whalley
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986); or Rodrique
Trembley, "Adjustment Concerns during the Transition to
North American Free Trade," in Assessing the Canada-U.S.
Free Trade Agreement, eds. Murray Smith and Frank Stone
(Halifax: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1987).
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not likely to be willing to make large, long run investments 
only to have the FTA dissolved.
Adding to the sunk cost considerations that weaken the 
impact of the FTA, the political instability surrounding the 
agreement in both countries makes the agreement's future 
inherently unstable. Two of the three major political 
parties in Canada vehemently oppose the agreement. If one 
of these parties forms a government in Canada the agreement 
will almost certainly be dissolved. In the United States, 
if the mood of the Congress becomes protectionist, e.g. the 
costs of the agreement are too high given the perceived 
benefits, the agreement could be dissolved. The historical 
instability of trade liberalization attempts between the 
United States and Canada support this contention. This 
instability does affect the actions of the energy industries 
on both sides of the border.
North Dakota energy producers weren't expected to gain 
new markets as a result of the agreement. The purpose of 
including energy in the agreement was to guarantee American 
access to Canadian energy supplies.4 Williams' analysis of 
the industries expected to make gains from the FTA points to 
those that have enjoyed the protection of tariffs.5 With 
the exception of government procurement policies and some
4External Affairs Canada, The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement [Ottawa, Ont.]: External Affairs Canada, January 1988.
5See chapter three and James R. Williams, Resources, 
Tariffs and Trade: Ontario's Stake. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978)
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energy regulation, North Dakota and Canada have enjoyed 
fairly open access to each other's energy. The obvious 
benefits of the FTA would accrue to: states with industry 
requiring large and stable amounts of energy; states that 
are dependent outside of their boundaries for energy 
resources; and states that are rapidly depleting its 
resources. North Dakota doesn't fall into any of the above 
categories. But as mentioned earlier, the less obvious 
benefits of maintaining the status quo is beneficial for 
North Dakota energy producers and consumers.
But a benefit of the agreement that may not so obvious 
is that the FTA does make the North Dakota electricity 
producer aware of its Canadian competition. The North 
Dakota producer of electricity may have new markets 
available to it because of the electricity generating 
situation in Manitoba, although this is not directly the 
result of the FTA. Manitoba's electricity generation 
resource, water, experiences fluctuation cycles, at times 
leaving Manitoba unable to generate sufficient electricity 
to meet its domestic commitments. Power sharing agreements 
between Northern States Power Company and Manitoba have in 
the past compensated for these shortages of electricity. 
North Dakota should agressively seek those types of 
agreements for the sharing of its excess power. The 
negotiations set to develop electricity in a mutually 
beneficial manner may in fact lean toward this type of an 
arrangement.
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A major determinant of the impact and stability of the 
agreement is the effect that the agreement will have on the 
multilateral world trading system, and more specifically, on 
the members of the GATT. If the agreement can have a 
significant impact on the way goods are traded among the 
members of the GATT, and can ease the tensions of the most 
recent trade conflict among the members of the GATT6, then 
perhaps the agreement will last a long time. It can be 
reasonably assumed that if the conflict can be resolved 
among the GATT's membership, the United States and Canada 
will then benefit from free trade because Canada, and more 
especially, the United States, has been shut out of many 
potential export markets because of the high tariff and non­
tariff barriers of the other GATT members. There is a 
strong indication that North Dakota will realize a benefit 
from this situation in agricultural production, but in 
energy there would appear to be no additional benefits as 
such. North Dakota's oil industry, for instance, has 
experienced its greatest growth when foreign suppliers of 
oil are unstable.7 The OPEC oil embargos of the 1970s 
attest to that fact.
Confidence is the key to the agreement changing the 
attitudes and behaviors of the parties involved. Gaining 
confidence in the capital intensive industries is difficult,
f t For instance the U.S.-EEC agricultural subsidy war.
7Scot A. Stradley, A Staple Perspective on Economic 
Development in North Dakota.
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however. If confidence cannot be achieved in capital 
intensive industries, the agreement will have little effect 
on North Dakota's energy. Agriculture, North Dakota's other 
economic staple, finds itself is a different situation, 
however. Agriculture has the potential to shift production 
quickly among many commodities. The Canadians will have 
access to the U.S. market, but the reciprocal will not be 
the case until the U.S. drops a great deal of the
subsidization that exists for its grain producers. It is
<
therefore important to pursue further study of the FTA's 
effects in the area of agriculture.
What appears clear in the implementation of the FTA is 
that the potential effects on the American and Canadian 
economies may not be seen for some time. As mentioned in 
chapter three, the tariff reduction schedules will not be 
fully completed until 1998. If one looks at the EEC as a 
model for the harmonization of the economies of a free trade 
area, it appears that the U.S. and Canada will have to wait 
a long time for the benefits and costs of the FTA on sectors 
of the North American economy to take hold. The EEC, 
established in 1958 on a limited scale, has yet to see a 
total harmonization of its members' economies. The EEC is 
set to undertake a more comprehensive harmonization of its 
economy slated for 1992. Until the harmonization of the 
American and Canadian economies occurs, the FTA may seem 
quite neutral.
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As the FTA will not change the energy trading 
relationship between North Dakota and Canada, by implication 
North Dakota's reliance on its energy industries for a 
significant portion of general fund revenue and transfer 
payments to local governments will unfortunately remain tied 
to the world price of crude oil. The stabilization of 
energy supply that goes along with the free trade in energy 
produces a more stable tax base, at least to the extent of 
OPEC's ability to maintain price stability. Thus the 
challenge of stabilizing the revenue base in North Dakota 
still needs to be addressed, which has been a factor 
underlying the analysis from the beginning. But the FTA 
itself does present opportunities in sectors other than 
energy that must be explored. Because there is a potential 
for enhanced economic development and economic diversity as 
a result of the FTA, the state should explore the potential 
of the agreement not only to diversify the state's economy, 
but also to diversify North Dakota's tax base as well.
The FTA also presents a favorable situation that may 
not appear so obvious to North Dakota's political leaders as 
well. The agreement provides policymakers with a reminder 
of the economic situation in the North Dakota: the 
performance and the nature of the market for staple industry 
products in North Dakota has been abysmal lately. There 
have been repeated calls to diversify the North Dakota 
economy; the agreement at least gives us an opportunity to
re-examine the economic makeup of North Dakota and to 
discover ways to make it more stable.
The writer has addressed the many difficulties in 
assessing the impacts of the FTA. As such, admittedly, much 
more study is needed to be able to put an actual cost or 
benefit the FTA will have on North Dakota's economy.
Although all the costs and the benefits aren't quantified, 
on the whole there seems to be a net benefit as a result of
the FTA's maintaining the status quo in energy trade. As
<
such, North Dakota should be content with the agreement.
The state should now turn its attention to finding ways to 
use the agreement to effect an optimum balance of importing 
energy for domestic use and producing and extracting for 
domestic use and interstate sale.
A New Direction: Recommendations 
It should come as no surprise to anyone familiar with 
the economy of North Dakota that the state in the 1980s has 
been and remains in serious fiscal trouble. As a result, 
people are leaving the state, per capita income increases 
have not kept pace in the past few years with inflation, 
state services have suffered under shrinking budgets in real 
dollars, to name a few symptoms of the problem. The FTA 
should be looked at as a means of expanding the North Dakota 
economy and getting away from its historical dependence on 
its staple existance. North Dakota has longed for the 
diversification of its economy for many years. The Fifty- 




the role of the North Dakota Economic Development Commission 
and its task of seeking to attract the kind of business that 
will bring much needed diversification to the North Dakota 
economy and much needed tax base stability.8 What this 
debate has failed to even consider is the impact and the 
opportunities that the United States-Canada Free Trade 
Agreement may bring about. Thus the continued woes of the 
state's economic crises have left intact the characteristic 
of the most recent legislative assemblies, their short-
i
sightedness.
North Dakota should follow the lead of another American 
city, Buffalo, New York, in seeking to secure its own 
economic well-being. Buffalo is currently making an effort 
to take advantage of the agreement by attempting to entice 
business from the Canadian side of the border to move to the 
stronger business climate the American side of the border 
has to offer. New York can offer this more attractive 
environment even though it has the third highest tax burden 
of any state in the United States.9 But the attractiveness 
of Buffalo lies in its low tax rates and the quality of its 
economic enhancement programs relative to Ontario, and 
especially Quebec.
OFor a discussion of North Dakota's economic climate 
see Maurice A. Bouvier and Cynthia Feland Economic 
Development in North Dakota and South Dakota: A Comparison 
of Business Climates. Economic Development Programs, and 
Other Economic Development Variables (Bismarck, N.D.: North 
Dakota Legislative Council, 7 March 1989).
9Grant Thornton Manufacturing Climates Study (New York: 
Prentice Hall, July 1988).
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North Dakota can offer Canadian light manufacturing 
firms a more attractive business climate than can New York 
or most other states for that matter. According to a study 
of manufacturing climates undertaken by the Grant Thornton 
Company in 1988, North Dakota ranks second in manufacturing 
attractiveness in the United States, second to only South 
Dakota.10 New York rates only forty-third relative to all 
other states. Of course the costs of transportation from 
North Dakota to major markets within the United States and 
Canada has to be considered. Nonetheless, North Dakota's 
attractiveness to business must be marketed wherever 
possible.
Although North Dakota has been relatively unsuccessful 
in attracting business from within the borders of the United 
States, much of the unattractiveness of North Dakota has 
been its weather and lack of an integrated transportation 
system.11 However, North Dakota's strength lies in its low 
wage rates, the low rate of unionization, and its low worker 
compensation costs. North Dakota must take steps forward to 
lure Canadian manufacturing to North Dakota, stressing 
business climates, and offering incentives to perspective 
business. As mentioned earlier in this paper, the six month 
cancelation clause will limit the kind of business that 
North Dakota will be able to attract. North Dakota's 
greatest possibility for attracting business, and
i n  .Grant Thornton Manufacturing Climates Study. 1988.
i:LGrant Thornton Manufacturing Climates Study. 1988.
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diversifying its economy, thus lies in the area of light 
manufacturing.
In attempting to lure Canadian business, North Dakota 
should choose to re-examine the quality and attractiveness 
of its business incentives. Presently North Dakota ranks 
near the bottom (46th) of the Grant Thornton Manufacturing 
Climates Study in state business incentives. * This index 
comprises dollars dedicated to grant, equity, and early 
stage debt programs; number of participants served under the 
Job Training Partnership Act per unemployed person in the 
state; five-year change in the unemployment rate; new 
business formation as a percentage of all businesses; 
taxability of machinery used/consumed in production; 
inventory tax exemptions; and sales tax rates. Table 5.1, 
which follows, compares this index with selected states in 
the United States (National average is 1.00).
An example of the kind of manufacturing that could be 
attracted to North Dakota is bus manufacturing. Pembina, 
North Dakota and Winnipeg, Manitoba are currently working on 
different manufacturing processes on the same buses. The 
FTA calls for a tariff reduction schedule of "C" on buses 
going into Canada (Canadian tariff of 9.2%) and schedule "D" 
on buses going into the United States (no U.S. tariff on 
Canadian buses going into the American market). It may be 
less risky, and more profitable, for North Dakota to try to 
obtain the whole manufacturing process toward the end of the
12Grant Thornton Manufacturing Climates Study. 1988.
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phase-in period of the FTA. But the opportunities that the 
FTA brings to North Dakota lie not only in light 
manufacturing.
Table 5.1 Ranking of State Business
Incentives: Selected States.
State National Rank Factor Valuea




New York 11 1.158
South Dakota 31 0.940
aThis figure is derived from a number of variables related 
to the attractiveness of business incentives, as explained 
in the paragraph preceding this table. The higher the 
factor, the more attractive the state's incentives (national average is 1.00).
Source: Grant Thornton Manufacturing Climates Study (New 
York: Prentice Hall, July 1988).
Although transportation itself is not included in the 
provision of the FTA, the opportunity to store and allow for 
the distribution of products is not prohibited. North 
Dakota's location in the North American continent leaves it 
in a good position to become a distribution center for 
Canadian goods coming into the United States and American 
goods going into Canada. North Dakota's interstate highway 
system directly links it to the major market in Winnipeg (a 
major Canadian distribution center), and indirectly links it
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to the other western Canadian cities (via the TransCanada 
Highway). Fargo also sits in an ideal position to serve the 
major mid-western market of Minneapolis, Kansas City, and 
beyond.
The above examples illustrate the need for North Dakota 
to become imaginative in exploring the opportunities 
afforded by the FTA. North Dakota doesn't however have the 
luxury of attracting all different types of industries 
covered in the.agreement. But what it may do over and above 
the area of light manufacturing is seek development in the 
area of agricultural products processing. The state's 
economy would be less dependent on agricultural production 
yet receive the benefits of adding value to its production. 
The lack of value-added economic activity in North Dakota 
leaves the state subject to the boom and bust cycles it is 
all too familiar with.
Although the FTA is not certain to be around for a long 
time, North Dakota must search for its opportunities. The 
North Dakota Economic Development Commission (EDC) is not 
presently doing a great job in planning for the impacts of 
the FTA. North Dakota cannot create diversity in its 
economy until the EDC acts to explore the opportunities 
other than in the staple industries, i.e., by enticing other 
viable economic activity. The United States-Canada Free 
Trade Agreement has the potential to help North Dakota 
expand its economy in its staple industries as well as other
areas. If the United States and Canada are successful in
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leading the world into the twenty-first century in free 
trade, North Dakota's agriculture industry will boom, and 
perhaps its economy will not be held hostage to the boom and 
bust cycles that have characterized its economy in the 
twentieth century. North Dakota residents and the North 
Dakota treasury certainly needs and hopes for this type of 
stability.
Unfortunately, the agreement does not guarantee OPEC 
oil production stability. The ability to influence the
4;
world trading system rests on the pressure exerted by the 
two parties to this agreement on the world trading system.
If this agreement is successful in exerting pressure, 
perhaps trade will stabilize the North Dakota economy in a 
manner it has not been able to achieve in the past.
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APPENDIX A
NORTH DAKOTA GROSS STATE PRODUCT BY INDUSTRY, 1949-1986.
(Millions of $) 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953




31.7 32.4 36.9 38.6 38.0
TRANS/COMM/P.U. 
Transportations Communications Public Utilities '
85.2 90.8 99.3 105.6 111.0
WHSLE & RETAIL TRADE 
Wholesale Trade 
Retail Trade




51.0 58.0 62.1 68.1 79.0
SERVICES 51.2 55.6 59.1 63.3 72.0GOVERNMENT 79.9 80.9 89.8 98.1 101.3
TOTAL GSP 885.7 1019.0 1076.0 1033.3 1062.7
(Millions of $) 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958
FARMING 349.6 433.4 424.9 379.0 485.2
AGRIC. SERVICES 3.2 3.5 3.4 3.4 4.8MINING 32.2 33.5 35.1 34.2 40.3CONSTRUCTION 65.7 50.0 58.5 67.2 67.5MANUFACTURING 40.8 43.8 42.6 46.8 49.9Non-Durable 37.6Durable 12.4TRANS/COMM/P.U. 109.8 115.4 121.6 125.0 124.4Transportations 70.2Communications 23.9Public Utilities 30.3WHSLE & RETAIL TRADE 214.0 229.6 237.8 249.6 256.3Wholesale Trade 97.7Retail Trade 158.6FIN-INS/REAL ESTATE 86.2 88.9 95.7 106.7 116.0Finance-Insurance 30.4Real Estate 85.7SERVICES 74.6 74.2 78.2 82.9 89.1GOVERNMENT 105.0 107.8 114.6 121.6 133.1
TOTAL GSP 1081.1 1180.1 1212.3 1216.5 1366.9
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NORTH DAKOTA GROSS STATE PRODUCT BY INDUSTRY, 1949-1986.
(Millions of $) 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963
FARMING 317.3 404.8 266.1 631.2 460.0
AGRIC. SERVICES 4.7 3.7 3.8 4.0 3.9
MINING 39.8 31.4 35.4 33.3 31.8CONSTRUCTION 77.8 72.7 73.2 91.5 90.8
MANUFACTURING 54.7 52.2 51.5 53.6 67.4
Non-Durable 40.4 38.2 38.8 39.9 40.8
Durable 14.3 14.1 12.7 13.7 26.6
TRANS/COMM/P.U. 133.3 139.0 143.7 151.3 159.7Transportations 71.2 69.9 69.5 71.5 72 .5Communications 27.7 30.0 32.2 34.3 37.7
Public Utilities 34.5 39.1 42.1 45.5 49.5
WHSLE & RETAIL TRADE 275.5 276.1 277.7 300.8 310.3
Wholesale Trade 106.3 106.1 109.4 127.7 123.8
Retail Trade 169.1 170.0 168.3 173.1 186.5
FIN-INS/REAL ESTATE 129.5 139.9 146.5 157.8 168.3
Finance-Insurance 34.5 38.9 37.2 38.6 39.9
Real Estate 94.9 101.0 109.3 119.2 128.5
SERVICES 99.1 105.3 112.3 117.4 123.0
GOVERNMENT 151.1 173.3 193.4 212.1 238.2
TOTAL GSP 1282.9 1398.9 1303.6 1752.8 1653.4
(Millions of $) 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968
FARMING 369.8 524.0 483.2 467.8 454.0
AGRIC. SERVICES 4.3 4.7 5.3 5.7 5.8
MINING 33.7 36.6 38.3 39.6 40.8
CONSTRUCTION 115.5 114.0 92.6 90.8 90.3
MANUFACTURING 69.9 78.3 89.6 85.3 93.1
Non-Durable 45.8 46.8 51.1 51.7 56.6
Durable 24.1 31.5 38.4 33.6 36.5
TRANS/COMM/P.U. 166.5 178.7 187.3 192.1 202.1
Transportations 72.7 79.9 82.8 81.0 83.4
Communications 39.4 41.7 45.4 49.1 53.5
Public Utilities 54.4 57.0 59.0 62.0 65.3
WHSLE & RETAIL TRADE 329.3 347.2 363.5 380.3 407.1
Wholesale Trade 130.2 139.2 145.9 149.0 158.3Retail Trade 199.2 208.0 217.5 231.4 248.8
FIN-INS/REAL ESTATE 169.2 184.0 192.2 199.2 196.5
Finance-Insurance 42.4 46.6 52.0 55.4 59.4
Real Estate 126.7 137.5 140.2 143.9 137.1
SERVICES 130.1 140.7 156.2 165.7 180.2GOVERNMENT 257.3 282.5 313.3 321.8 345.0
TOTAL GSP 1645.6 1890.8 1921.5 1948.3 2014.9
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NORTH DAKOTA GROSS STATE PRODUCT BY INDUSTRY, 1949-1986.
(Millions of $) 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
FARMING 582.0 492.1 684.1 890.9 2097.7AGRIC. SERVICES 10.7 11.5 14.3 14.6 18.0
MINING 42.7 42.7 43.1 41.7 48.1
CONSTRUCTION 109.5 144.6 165.2 200.9 197.5MANUFACTURING 99.2 112.7 125.7 135.9 165.1
Non-Durable 63.4 70.6 77.9 78.8 89.0
Durable 35.8 42.1 47.8 57.1 76.1TRANS/COMM/P.U. 228.4 240.0 267.5 298.2 325.2
Transportations 95.2 102.2 112.7 126.9 140.3
Communications 56.0 59.4 64.3 71.1 78.7
Public Utilities • 77.2 78.4 90.5 100.2 106.2
WHSLE & RETAIL TRADE 452.8 475.0 517.0 589.9 724.9Wholesale Trade 178.2 185.3 202.7 246.1 329.2
Retail Trade 274.6 289.7 314.3 343.8 395.7FIN-INS/REAL ESTATE 220.0 240.4 267.2 295.5 326.2
Finance-Insurance 68.2 73.8 81.2 89.6 95.5
Real Estate 151.8 166.6 186.0 205.9 230.7
SERVICES 226.2 241.0 261.9 287.3 338.1GOVERNMENT 374.2 423.3 461.4 507.1 546.3
TOTAL GSP 2345.7 2423.3 2807.4 3262.0 4780.1
(Millions of $) 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
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3 3 . 4
2 2 1 . 7
5 0 9 . 0  
3 3 4 . 6
1 6 5 . 1  
1 6 9 . 5
6 0 4 . 4
2 5 6 . 8
1 4 0 . 1
2 0 7 . 5  
1 2 1 0 . 0
5 7 3 . 1
6 3 6 . 9
6 8 9 . 5
211.6
4 7 7 . 9  
668.0 
8 1 9 . 3
TOTAL GSP
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NORTH DAKOTA GROSS STATE PRODUCT BY INDUSTRY, 1949-1986.
(Millions of $) 1979 1980 1981 1982 198
FARMING 1614.2 1053.2 1685.0 1739.1 1338 .AGRIC. SERVICES 35.8 32.9 35.3 40.1 49.MINING 353.4 623.3 1074.8 869.1 653 .
CONSTRUCTION 540.0 523.7 501.1 565.2 660.
MANUFACTURING 371.1 373.6 410.4 428.3 460.
Non-Durable 177.8 188.2 221.0 253.1 280.
Durable 193.3 185.4 189.4 175.2 179.
TRANS/COMM/P.U. 675.4 766.4 840.9 980.3 1128 .
Transportations 301.2 340.4 369.4 360.5 363 .
Communications 148.0 170.5 184.0 196.3 212 .
Public Utilities ■ 226.2 255.5 287.5 423.5 552 .
WHSLE & RETAIL TRADE 1375.6 1419.6 1547.7 1604.5 1613 .Wholesale Trade 671.2 707.1 787.7 797.9 768 .
Retail Trade 704.4 712.5 760.0 806.6 844 .
FIN-INS/REAL ESTATE 722.7 769.7 828.2 839.2 923 .
Finance-Insurance 231.1 254.3 270.6 272.0 308 .Real Estate 491.6 514.4 557.6 567.2 615.
SERVICES 750.1 856.5 988.6 1062.2 1155.
GOVERNMENT 890.1 966.3 1101.2 1194.7 1274 .
TOTAL GSP 7328.4 7385.2 9013.2 9322.7 9253 .
(Millions of $) 1984 1985 1986
FARMING 1829.0 1751.4 1395.6
AGRIC. SERVICES 44.3 36.3 38.9
MINING 689.7 632.3 399.9
CONSTRUCTION 524.4 447.1 436.0
MANUFACTURING 506.2 520.7 530.7
Non-Durable 300.6 311.4 525.8
Durable 205.6 209.3 204.9
TRANS/COMM/P.U. 1294.4 1317.2 1298.8
Transportations 397.4 385.7 378.4
Communications 214.5 225.3 227.8
Public Utilities 682.5 706.2 692.6
WHSLE & RETAIL TRADE 1736.8 1754.3 1749.1
Wholesale Trade 842.0 827.7 819.4Retail Trade 894.8 926.6 929.7
FIN-INS/REAL ESTATE 963.0 971.1 1020.5Finance-Insurance 304.7 322.8 347.4Real Estate 658.3 648.3 673.1SERVICES 1245.6 1314.8 1375.4GOVERNMENT 1352.7 1448.5 1503.6




















Note: Sub-sector detail not available prior to 1958
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Sources: Richard Kauffman and Bulent Uyar "North Dakota Gross State Product, 1949, 1983 (University of 
North Dakota: Bureau of Business and Economic 
Research, December 1985).
and
Bulent Uyar "North Dakota Gross State Product: 1969-1986. (University of North Dakota: Bureau of Business and Economic Research, forthcoming).
162
APPENDIX B
PROVISIONS OF THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 
NOT APPLICABLE TO ENERGY
This appendix summarizes the provisions of the U. S. - 
Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA) that do not apply to the 
energy sector, but are included to provided a complete 
presentation of the FTA's provisions. This presentation is
also provided to augment the recommendation section of
(
chapter five.
Agriculture This section eliminates all bilateral 
tariffs and export subsidies, and limits or eliminates 
guantitative restrictions on some agricultural products, 
including meat. Quotas on poultry and poultry products on 
U.S. exports going into the Canadian market are allowed. 
American sugar subsidies and nontariff protection are also 
retained under the agreement. Canadian import licenses and 
some other nontariff barriers for wheat, oats, and barley 
are eliminated when U.S. crop price supports are equal or 
less than those in Canada.
The above provisions of the agreement provide for a 
more open North American market for agricultural products. 
But implicit in freer trade in agricultural commodities is 
the potential effect of trade liberalization on GATT 
nations, and more especially, the European Economic 
Community (EEC). The agreement appears to be an explicit 
attemp to force the hand of the EEC members to eliminate
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production and export subsidies so that agricultural 
production will be based on efficiency and not on subsidies. 
If the U.S. and Canada are able to change world subsidy 
behavior as a result of their own bilateral trade 
liberalization, both countries should gain as their 
production is more efficient than any other country.
Wine and Distilled Spirits Currently Canadian wine 
and distilled spirits are protected in Canada from America's 
similar products. The FTA seeks to eliminate all barriers 
to the trade in these commodities over a seven year period 
from 1989 through 1995. Most discriminatory practices 
against wine and spirits imported from the other country are 
removed, with the exception of Ontario and British Columbian 
private wine outlets, which are allowed to favor their own 
wine if the outlet was established before October 5, 1987. 
Beer and other malt products are exempted from this 
agreement; current discriminatory practices afforded 
Canadian beer producers will remain intact.
Autos Trade in automobiles is presently free, 
governed by a bilateral agreement separate from the FTA: the 
Auto Pact. The FTA builds on the provisions of the Auto 
Pact to ensure that the trading of automobiles and 
automobile parts are not subject to discriminatory actions 
of one or both of the parties to the FTA.
The big three (GM, Ford and Crysler) as well as other 
automakers will benefit from the agreement. Automobiles and 
parts from all over the world will be allowed into the free
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trade zone provided that these goods meet the Auto Pact 
production safeguards; safeguards that promote the 
continuance of a strong automobile manufacturing presence in 
North America in the midst of strict foreign competition.
The rules of origin, discussed in chapter three will govern 
the import of automobiles and automobile parts.
In addition to protecting the automobile manufacturing 
in the free trade zone, one of the major goals of the FTA
and the Auto Pact is the expansion of the North American
*!
automobile market into countries that currently export 
automobiles into the free trade zone. A select panel for 
the purpose of advising the North American automobile 
industry will be set up for this purpose.
Exceptions for Trade in Goods The FTA provides for 
import and export controls on certain goods for the 
following reasons:
1. to protect public morals (prohibition of pornographic 
materials);
2. necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health (measures to protect the environment or endangered 
species);
3. trade in gold or silver;
4. necessary to ensure compliance with domestic laws and 
regulations not otherwise inconsistent with the GATT (such 
as product standards);
5. Relating to the products of prisoner labor;
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6. necessary to protect national treasures of artistic, 
historic, or archaelogical value; and
7. undertaken in pursuance of an international commodity 
agreement (such as the international wheat or tin 
agreement).
The exemptions for the above reasons are consistent with the 
GATT, Article XX. Without such exemptions, there would be 
very little chance of establishing such a wide-sweeping 
trade agreement.1 •
(
Services Within the last two decades much of the 
grwoth in the American and Canadian economies' has been in 
the area of services. During this period of growth of the 
service industries in the United States and Canada, the GATT 
negotiations have failed to provide adequate protection 
against discriminatory trade practices in services. "It is 
no longer possible to talk about free trade in goods without 
talking about free trade in services because trade in 
services is increasingly mingled with the production, sale, 
distribution and service of goods."2 The FTA proposes to 
break new ground in this area, providing a framework for 
member nations to update the GATT.
Services covered by the FTA include the production, 
distribution, sale, marketing, and delivery of services, as 
well as the establishment of a commercial presence to
1External Affairs Canada. Canada-U.S. Free Trade 
Agreement (Ottawa: External Affairs Canada, 1987).
2External Affairs Canada. Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: 194.
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# . # , O .distribute, market and deliver services. Most commercial 
services are covered in the FTA with the exception of:
1. Transportation;





7. Government services (e.g education, social
i
services).
It is expected that more services will be added to be 
covered in the agreement in the coming years. Negotiations 
will be periodically untaken to accomplish this expansion, 
however the time frame is unspecified.4
Each government may choose to regulate covered 
industries as long as both countries' services are treated 
equally. Regulation (including licensing and certification) 
may not be a disguise for trade discrimination. If 
regulation is challenged by one of the parties as being 
discriminatory, the burden of proof lies with the party 
establishing the regulation.5 Regulations already in effect 
do not have to change; only new regulations imposed by the
•"External Affairs Canada. Canada-U.S. Free TradeAgreement: Section 1401.2.
4External Affairs Canada. Canada-U.S. Free TradeAgreement: Section 1405.
5External Affairs Canada. Canada-U.S. Free TradeAgreement: Section 1403.2.
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parties have to comply with the provisions of this 
agreement.
Financial Services Each of the parties will be 
guaranteed access to each of the other party's market for a 
full range of financial services.6 Until 1987, Canadians 
had greater access to the American banking market than was 
true of the reciprocal. The FTA guarantees American access 
to the banking market of Canada. American bankers will no 
longer be subject to foreign investment ceilings in the
i
Canadian financial market.
Applications of American banking to conduct business in 
Canada will continue to be subject to refusal based on the 
stability of the institution, and the applicants ability to 
contribute to Canadian financial markets.7 Disputes 
invloving financial services, with the exception of 
insurance, are not covered by the dispute procedures of this 
agreement. The Department of the Treasury of the U.S. and 
the Department of Finance of Canada will consult in disputes 
of these manners.
^External Affairs Canada. Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: Section 1702.
7External Affairs Canada. Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: Section 1703.
